



## Security Target for Junos OS 22.2R1 for SRX380

Juniper Networks, Inc.

Version 1.2

21 May 2024

Prepared for:  
Juniper Networks, Inc.  
1133 Innovation Way  
Sunnyvale, CA 94089  
[www.juniper.net](http://www.juniper.net)

## Abstract

This document provides the basis for an evaluation of a specific Target of Evaluation (TOE), Junos OS 22.2R1 for SRX380. The TOE can operate in single mode or in cluster mode, also known as high availability (HA). Cluster Mode is a configuration in where a pair of devices are connected and configured to operate like a single device to provide high availability. This Security Target (ST) is conformant to the Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices [CPP\_ND], PP-Module for stateful packet filters [MOD\_CPP\_FW], PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems v1.0 [MOD\_IPS], PP-Module for VPN Gateways [MOD\_VPNGW] and Ethernet Encryption [MACSEC].

## References

- [CC1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model, CCMB-2017-04-001, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
- [CC2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2017-04-002, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
- [CC3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2017-04-003, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
- [CC\_Add] CC and CEM addenda, Exact Conformance, Selection-Based SFRs, Optional SFRs, Unique Identifier: 013, Version: 2.0, Status: Final, Date of issue: 23-Sep-2021
- [MOD\_CPP\_FW] PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625 25-June-2020
- [MOD\_IPS] PP-Module for Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Version 1.0, 11-May-2021
- [CPP\_ND] Collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e 23-March-2020
- [PP\_CONF] PP-Configuration for Network Device, Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1, 18 May 2021
- [MOD\_VPNGW] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version: 1.1, 18 June 2020
- [MACSEC] Network Device Collaborative Protection Profile (NDcPP) Extended Package MACsec Ethernet Encryption Version 1.2, dated 2016.05.10.

## Product Guide References

- [ECG] Junos OS Common Criteria Guide for SRX320, SRX340, SRX345, SRX345-Dual-AC and SRX380 Devices, Release 22.2R1, 21 November 2022

## Table of Contents

1	Introduction .....	6
1.1	ST reference .....	6
1.2	TOE Reference.....	6
1.3	About this document .....	6
1.4	Document Conventions .....	6
1.5	TOE Overview.....	7
1.6	TOE Description.....	7
1.6.1	Overview .....	7
1.6.2	Physical boundary .....	8
1.6.3	Logical Boundary.....	9
1.6.4	Cluster Mode configuration .....	11
1.6.5	Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware .....	12
1.6.6	Summary of out scope items .....	12
2	Conformance Claim.....	14
2.1	CC Conformance Claim .....	14
2.2	PP Conformance claim .....	14
2.3	Technical Decisions .....	14
2.3.1	Technical decisions applicable to the TOE.....	14
2.3.2	Other technical decisions.....	17
3	Security Problem Definition.....	18
3.1	Threats .....	18
3.2	Assumptions.....	21
3.3	Organizational Security Policies .....	23
4	Security Objectives.....	24
4.1	Security Objectives for the TOE .....	24
4.2	Security Objectives for the Operational Environment.....	27
4.3	Security Objectives rationale .....	28
5	Security Functional Requirements.....	29
5.1	Security Audit (FAU).....	29
5.1.1	Security Audit Data generation (FAU_GEN).....	29
5.1.2	Security audit event storage (Extended – FAU_STG_EXT).....	34
5.2	Cryptographic Support (FCS).....	34
5.2.1	Cryptographic Key Management (FCS_CKM).....	34
5.2.2	Cryptographic Operation (FCS_COP) .....	36
5.2.3	Random Bit Generation (Extended – FCS_RBG_EXT).....	37

5.2.4	Cryptographic Protocols (Extended – FCS_IPSEC_EXT, FCS_MACSEC_EXT, FCS_NTP_EXT & FCS_SSHS_EXT SSH Protocols).....	37
5.3	Identification and Authentication (FIA) .....	42
5.3.1	Authentication Failure Management (FIA_AFL) .....	42
5.3.2	Password Management (Extended – FIA_PMG_EXT).....	42
5.3.3	User Identification and Authentication (Extended – FIA_UIA_EXT) .....	43
5.3.4	User authentication (FIA_UAU) (Extended – FIA_UAU_EXT).....	43
5.3.5	Authentication using X.509 certificates (Extended – FIA_X509_EXT).....	43
5.4	Security Management (FMT) .....	45
5.4.1	Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF).....	45
5.4.2	Management of TSF Data (FMT_MTD) .....	45
5.4.3	Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF).....	45
5.4.4	Security management roles (FMT_SMR) .....	47
5.5	Protection of the TSF (FPT) .....	47
5.5.1	Protection of TSF Data (Extended – FPT_SKP_EXT) .....	47
5.5.2	Protection of Administrator Passwords (Extended – FPT_APW_EXT).....	47
5.5.3	TSF testing (Extended – FPT_TST_EXT) .....	48
5.5.4	Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT) .....	48
5.5.5	Time stamps (Extended – FPT_STM_EXT)) .....	48
5.5.6	Self-test Failures (FPT_FLS) .....	49
5.6	TOE Access (FTA).....	49
5.6.1	TSF-initiated Session Locking (Extended – FTA_SSL_EXT) .....	49
5.6.2	Session locking and termination (FTA_SSL) .....	49
5.6.3	TOE access banners (FTA_TAB).....	49
5.7	Trusted path/channels (FTP).....	49
5.7.1	Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC).....	49
5.7.2	Trusted Path (FTP_TRP).....	50
5.8	User Data Protection (FDP).....	50
5.8.1	Residual information protection (FDP_RIP).....	50
5.9	Packet Filtering (FPF) .....	51
5.9.1	Packet Filtering Rules (FPF_RUL_EXT).....	51
5.10	Firewall (FFW) .....	51
5.10.1	Stateful Traffic Filter Firewall (FFW_RUL_EXT) .....	51
5.11	Intrusion Prevention (IPS).....	53
5.11.1	Network Traffic Analysis (IPS_NTA_EXT) .....	53
5.11.2	IPS IP Blocking (IPS_IPB_EXT).....	54
5.11.3	Signature-Based IPS Functionality (IPS_SBD_EXT).....	54
5.11.4	Anomaly-Based IPS Functionality (IPS_ABD_EXT) .....	56

---

6	Security Assurance Requirements .....	57
7	TOE Summary Specification .....	58
7.1	Protected communications.....	58
7.1.1	Algorithms and zeroization .....	58
7.1.2	Random Bit Generation .....	64
7.1.3	SSH .....	64
7.1.4	IPsec .....	68
7.1.5	NTP.....	71
7.2	MACsec .....	71
7.3	Administrator Authentication.....	74
7.4	Correct Operation .....	76
7.5	Trusted Update .....	76
7.6	Audit.....	77
7.7	Management.....	81
7.8	User Data Protection.....	83
7.9	Packet Filtering/Stateful Traffic .....	83
7.10	Intrusion Prevention System.....	87
8	Rationales.....	91
8.1	SFR dependency analysis .....	91
9	Glossary.....	94

## 1 Introduction

1. This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), Security Target organization, document conventions, and terminology. It also includes an overview of the evaluated products.

### 1.1 ST reference

ST Title	Security Target for Junos OS 22.2R1 for SRX380
ST Revision	1.2
ST Date	15 April 2024
Author	Juniper Networks, Inc.
cPP/EP Conformance	[CPP_ND], [MOD_CPP_FW], [MOD_VPNGW], [MOD_IPS], [MACSEC]

### 1.2 TOE Reference

TOE Title	Junos OS 22.2R1 for SRX380
-----------	----------------------------

### 1.3 About this document

2. This Security Target follows the following format:

Section	Title	Description
1	Introduction	Provides an overview of the TOE and defines the hardware and firmware that make up the TOE as well as the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE
2	Conformance Claims	Lists evaluation conformance to Common Criteria versions, Protection Profiles, or Packages where applicable
3	Security Problem Definition	Specifies the threats, assumptions and organizational security policies that affect the TOE
4	Security Objectives	Defines the security objectives for the TOE/operational environment and provides a rationale to demonstrate that the security objectives satisfy the threats
5	Security Functional Requirements	Contains a statement of the functional requirements for this TOE
6	Security Assurance Requirements	Contains a statement of the assurance requirements for this TOE
7	TOE Summary Specification	Identifies the IT security functions provided by the TOE and maps them to the applicable security functional requirements

Table 1 Document Organization

### 1.4 Document Conventions

3. This document follows the same conventions as those applied in [CPP\_ND] in the completion of operations on Security Functional Requirements, namely:
  - Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component definition (ECD);
  - Refinement made in the ST: the refinement text is indicated with **bold text** and ~~strikethroughs~~;
  - Selection completed in the ST: the selection values are indicated with underlined text
4. e.g. “[*selection: disclosure, modification, loss of use*]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “disclosure” (completion;

- Assignment completed in the ST: indicated with *italicized text*;
  - Assignment completed within a selection in the ST: the completed assignment text is indicated with *italicized and underlined text*
5. e.g. “[selection: *change\_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]*]” in [CC2] or an ECD might become “*change\_default, select\_tag*” (completion of both selection and assignment);
- Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with “/” (e.g. “FCS\_COP.1/Hash”).

## 1.5 TOE Overview

6. The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Juniper Networks, Inc. Junos OS 22.2R1 operating system on Services Gateway appliances SRX380. The TOE can operate in single mode or in cluster mode, also known as high availability (HA). In cluster mode, a pair of devices are connected and configured to operate like a single device to provide high availability. When configured as a chassis cluster, the two nodes back up each other, with one node acting as the primary device and the other as the secondary device, ensuring stateful failover of processes and services in the event of system or hardware failure. If the primary device fails, the secondary device takes over processing of traffic. Further details of the Cluster Mode configuration are provided in Sect. 1.6.4.
7. The TOE supports definition and enforcement of information flow policies among network nodes. The TOE implements stateful inspection of every packet that traverses the network and provides a central point of control to manage the network security policy.
8. All information flows from one network node to another pass through an instance of the TOE. Information flow is controlled on the basis of network node addresses, protocol, type of access requested, and services requested. In support of the information flow security functions, the TOE ensures that security-relevant activity is audited and that the TOE functions are protected from potential attacks. The TOE also provides tools to manage all security functions.
9. The TOE also implements multi-site virtual private network (VPN) gateway and Intrusion Prevention System functionalities, capable of monitoring information flows to detect potential attacks based on pre-defined attack signature and anomaly characteristics in the traffic.

## 1.6 TOE Description

### 1.6.1 Overview

10. Each TOE is a security product that supports a variety of high-speed interfaces for medium/large networks and network applications. Juniper Networks routers share common Junos firmware, features, and technology for compatibility across platforms.
11. Each TOE is physically self-contained. It houses all software, firmware and hardware necessary to perform all functions. The hardware consists of two major components: the Services Gateway appliance itself and various PIC/PIMs which allow the appliances to communicate with the different types of networks that may be required within the environment where the Services Gateway appliances are used.
12. Each instance of the TOE consists of the following major architectural components:
- The Routing Engine (RE) runs the Junos firmware and provides Layer 3 routing services and network management for all operations necessary for the configuration and operation of the TOE. The RE also controls the flow of information through the TOE, including Network Address Translation (NAT) and all operations necessary for the encryption/decryption of packets for secure communication via the IPSec protocol.

- The Packet Forwarding Engine (PFE) provides all operations necessary for transit packet forwarding.
13. The Routing Engine and Packet Forwarding Engine perform their primary tasks independently, while constantly communicating through a high-speed internal link. This arrangement provides streamlined forwarding and routing control and the capability to run Internet-scale networks at high speeds.
  14. The SRX380 Services Gateway appliance supports numerous routing standards for flexibility and scalability as well as IETF SSHv2 and IPsec protocols. These functions can all be managed through the Junos firmware, either from a connected terminal console or via a network connection. Network management can be secured using IPsec and SSH protocols. All management, whether from a user connecting to a terminal or from the network, requires successful authentication.
  15. The TOE supports intrusion detection and prevention functionality, which allows it to detect and react to potential attacks in real time. The detection component of the IPS can be based on attack signatures which specify the characteristics of the potentially malicious traffic based on a variety of packet header and payload data attributes. Anomaly detection based on deviation of the monitored traffic from expected values is also supported.
  16. The TOE accomplish routing through a Virtual Router (VR) mechanism. The TOE can divide its routing component into two or more VRs with each VR maintaining its own list of known networks in the form of a routing table, routing logic, and associated security zones.
  17. In the evaluated deployment the TOE is managed and configured via Command Line Interface, either via a directly connected console or using SSH connections, which can be further protected using IPsec if required.

### 1.6.2 Physical boundary

18. The physical boundary of the TOE illustrated in Figure 1 is the entire chassis of the Services Gateway appliance. It includes both the hardware and the firmware of the TOE. The TOE is the Junos OS 22.2R1 firmware running on the SRX380 chassis summarised in Table 2 below. This includes the firmware implementing the Routing Engine and the ASICs implementing the Packet Forwarding Engine. Hence the TOE is contained within the physical boundary of the specified appliance chassis. The install package for the appliances is “junos-srxsme-22.2R1.9.tgz”.




Figure 1 TOE Physical Boundary

19. The TOE interfaces are comprised of the Network interfaces which pass traffic, and Management interface through which the administrative actions are handled.



Model	Network Ports	Firmware
SRX380	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Four Mini PIM slots</li> <li>• Sixteen 1Gb Ethernet LAN ports (RJ-45)</li> <li>• Four 10Gb SFP+ ports</li> <li>• One Management RJ45 port + mini-USB</li> <li>• One USB 3.0 port</li> </ul>	Junos OS 22.2R1

Table 2 TOE Physical Boundary Details

20. The Linecard implementing Ethernet layer security in accordance with the requirements stated in [MACSEC] is inbuilt in SRX380 hardware. It is not separately identifiable or replaceable.
21. The following PIM interface models are applicable to the TOE:
  - **SRX-MP-1T1E1-R**: T1/E1 Mini-PIM provides the physical connection to T1 or E1 network media types
  - **SRX-MP1VDSL2-R**: VDSL2 Mini-PIM is part of the xDSL family of modem technologies, which provide faster data transmission over a single flat untwisted or twisted pair of copper wires
  - **SRX-MP-LTE-AE** (North America, EU) and **SRX-MP-LTE-AA** (Asia, Australia): Mini-PIM providing wireless WAN support. The Mini-PIM contains an integrated modem and operates over 3G and 4G networks
  - **SRX-MP-WLAN-US** (US), **SRX-MP-WLAN-IL** (Israel), **SRX-MP-WLAN-WW** (worldwide): Wireless access point (Wi-Fi) Mini-PIM
  - **SRX-MP-ANT-EXT**: Antenna extension cable for WLAN Mini-PIM on SRX Series platforms.
22. The guidance document included as part of the TOE is [ECG].

### 1.6.3 Logical Boundary


23. The logical boundary of the TOE includes the following security functionality.

Security Functionality	Description
Protected Communications	<p>The TOE implements an SSH server for protected communications between itself and SSH clients. SSH is used by administrators to establish secure sessions between management stations and the TOE and to connect the TOE to external syslog servers.</p> <p>The TOE also implements IPsec for multi-site virtual private network (VPN) gateway functionality and to tunnel remote administrate SSH connections. Each application connecting to the TOE using SSH and IPsec must be successfully authenticated prior to any information exchange.</p> <p>Telnet, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) are out of scope.</p> <p>The TOE includes cryptographic modules which implement the underlying cryptographic services. The cryptographic services include key management and protection of stored keys, cryptographic algorithms, random bit generation, and crypto-administration. The cryptographic modules provide confidentiality and integrity services for authentication and for protecting communications with adjacent systems.</p> <p>The TOE can be configured to synchronise its time with one or more time servers using NTP.</p> <p>The TOE implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect Ethernet communication to ensure confidentiality and authenticity of all data exchanged through link layer communication.</p>
Administrator Authentication	<p>Administrative users must be successfully authenticated using unique identification and authentication data before any administrative access to the system is granted. Authentication data entered and stored on the TOE is protected. The TOE can be configured to terminate interactive user sessions and to present an access banner with warning messages prior to authentication.</p>
Correct Operation	<p>The TOE provides for cryptographic and non-cryptographic self-tests and is capable of automated recovery from failure states.</p>
Trusted Update	<p>The administrator can initiate update of the TOE firmware. The integrity of any firmware updates is verified prior to installation.</p>
Audit	<p>Junos auditable events are stored in the syslog files on the appliance and can be sent to an external log server via Netconf over SSH. Auditable events include start-up and shutdown of the audit functions, authentication events, service requests, IPS events, as well as the events listed in Table 4 and Table 5. Audit records include the date and time, event category, event type, username, and the outcome of the event (success or failure). Local syslog storage limits are configurable and are monitored. If the storage limits are reached the oldest logs will be overwritten.</p>

Security Functionality	Description
Management	<p>The TOE provides a Security Administrator role that is authorized and responsible for:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. configuration and maintenance of cryptographic protocols used in the establishment of secure connections to and from the TOE,</li> <li>2. regular reviews of all audit data,</li> <li>3. initiation of trusted update function,</li> <li>4. administration of VPN, IPS and Firewall functionalities, and</li> <li>5. all administrative tasks (e.g., creating the security policy).</li> </ol> <p>The devices are managed through a Command Line Interface (CLI) which is accessible through a local (serial) console connection or a remote administrative (SSH) session.</p>
Packet Filtering/Stateful Traffic Filtering	<p>The TOE provides stateful network traffic filtering based on examination of network packets and the application of information flow rules to each packet. Based on the rules, the TOE determines whether the packet is forwarded or dropped.</p>
Intrusion Prevention	<p>The administrator may configure the TOE to analyze IP-based network traffic forwarded to the TOE's interfaces and detect violations of administrator defined IPS policies. The TOE is capable of initiating a proactive response to terminate/interrupt an active potential threat and to initiate a response in real time to interrupt a suspicious traffic flow.</p>
User Data Protection/Information Flow Control	<p>The TOE is designed to forward network packets (i.e. information flows) from source network entities to destination network entities based on available routing information. This information is either provided directly by TOE users or indirectly from other network entities (outside the TOE) configured by the TOE users. The TOE has the capability to regulate the information flow across its interfaces. Traffic filters can be set in accordance with the presumed identity of the source, the identity of the destination, the transport layer protocol, the source service identifier, and the destination service identifier (TCP or UDP port number).</p>

#### 1.6.4 Cluster Mode configuration

24. The Administrator of the TOE can set up the Cluster Mode for High Availability (HA). The two hosts constituting a chassis cluster must have identical configuration except for one being configured to node 0 and the other to node 1. The two nodes are connected via two links: the HA control link and the HA fabric link. An example configuration of the TOE in Cluster Mode for high availability is depicted in Figure 2. Further details are given in [ECG].



**Figure 2 Example of the HA configuration of the TOE**

25. Critical security parameter data sent over the control link between the two chassis in Cluster Mode is protected using IPsec from active and passive eavesdropping. Without the internal IPsec key, an attacker cannot gain privilege access or observe traffic.
26. Note the scope of the TOE includes both cluster mode and non-cluster mode. In other words, the security functionality of the TOE has been evaluated both when the TOE is configured in cluster mode, connected to a secondary or primary node, as well as when the TOE operates in single (non-cluster) mode.

### 1.6.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware

27. The TOE requires SFPs/PIMs to operate and communicate with the connected network. The TOE also relies on the provision of the following items, none of which is part of the TOE, in the network environment:
  - Syslog server supporting SSHv2 connections to send audit logs;
  - SSHv2 client for remote administration;
  - Serial connection client for local administration;
  - IPsec peer
  - HA peer
  - MACsec peer.

### 1.6.6 Summary of out scope items

- Use of telnet, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.7.2)
- Use of TOE-terminated and TOE-initiated FTP connections, since they violate the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.7.2)
- Use of SNMP, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.7.2)

- Use of SSL, including management via J-Web, JUNOScript and JUNOScope, since it violates the Trusted Path requirement set (see Section 5.7.2)
- Use of CLI account super-user and junos root account.

## 2 Conformance Claim

### 2.1 CC Conformance Claim

28. This Security Target conforms to the requirements of Common Criteria v3.1, Revision 5 and is Part 2 extended and Part 3 conformant.

### 2.2 PP Conformance claim

29. This Security Target claims conformance to:

- PP-Configuration for Network Device, Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1 [PP\_CONF]

30. [PP\_CONF] includes the following components:

- Base-PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 2.2e [CPP\_ND]
- PP-Module: PP-Module for Intrusion Protection Systems (IPS), Version 1.0 [MOD\_IPS]
- PP-Module: PP-Module for Stateful Traffic Filter Firewalls, Version 1.4 + Errata 20200625 [MOD\_CPP\_FW]
- PP-Module: PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, Version 1.1 [MOD\_VPNGW]

31. In lieu of any available PP-module facilitating the Ethernet layer security by this class of network device, this ST conforms to the NIAP Extended Package [MACSEC]. This approach is supported by the fact that [MACSEC] also requires exact conformance, as is required by [CC\_Add] when adding requirements from a Package or PP-Module (i.e. [MACSEC]) to Base-PPs (in this case [CPP\_ND]).

32. The security problem definition, security objectives and security functional requirements (SFRs) in this ST are consistent with the security problem definition, security objectives and security functional requirements in [PP\_CONF] and the Extended Package [MACSEC].

33. The security assurance requirements (SARs) specified in this ST are those in [PP\_CONF].

34. The distributed TOE deployment aspects described in [CPP\_ND] are not applicable as this TOE is satisfied by each model of the TOE in isolation.

### 2.3 Technical Decisions

35. In line with Labgram #105, this section identifies all NIAP Technical Decisions that are applicable to this TOE.

#### 2.3.1 Technical decisions applicable to the TOE

ITEM	TITLE	REFERENCE	PUBLICATION DATE	Relevant to ST
TD0800	<a href="#">Updated NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance</a>	FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 , FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 , CPP_ND_V2.2-SD	2023.11.13	Yes
TD0792	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision: FIA_PMG_EXT.1 - TSS EA not in line with SFR</a>	FIA_PMG_EXT.1, CPP_ND_V2.2-SD	2023.09.27	Yes
TD0790	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision: Clarification Required for testing IPv6</a>	FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1. 2, FCS_TLSC_EXT1.2	2023.09.27	No
TD0738	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Link to Allowed-With List</a>	Chapter 2	2023.05.19	No

ITEM	TITLE	REFERENCE	PUBLICATION DATE	Relevant to ST
TD0670	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Mutual and Non-Mutual Auth TLSC Testing</a>	ND SD2.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.1	2022.09.16	No
TD0654	<a href="#">MACsec data delay protection and updated conditional support for group CAK</a>	FCS_MKA_EXT.1.2, FCS_MKA_EXT.1.5, FCS_MKA.1.8	2023.08.23	Yes
TD0652	MACsec CAK Lifetime in FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1	2022.08.31	Yes
TD0639	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Clarification for NTP MAC Keys</a>	FCS_NTP_EXT.1.2, FAU_GEN.1, FCS_CKM.4, FPT_SKP_EXT.1	2022.08.26	Yes
TD0638	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Key Pair Generation for Authentication</a>	NDSDv2.2, FCS_CKM.1	2022.08.05	Yes
TD0636	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of Public Key User Authentication for SSH</a>	ND SD2.2, FCS_SSHC_EXT.1	2022.03.21	No
TD0635	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for TLS Server and Key Agreement Parameters</a>	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.3, NDSD v2.2	2022.03.21	No
TD0634	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Clarification required for testing IPv6</a>	FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.2, FCS_TLSC_EXT.1.2, ND SD v2.2	2022.03.21	No
TD0633	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for IPsec IKE/SA Lifetimes Tolerance</a>	ND SD2.2, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7, FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8	2022.03.21	Yes
TD0632	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Consistency with Time Data for vNDs</a>	ND SD2.2, FPT_STM_EXT.1.2	2022.03.21	No
TD0631	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of public key authentication for SSH Server</a>	ND SDv2.2, FCS_SSHS_EXT.1, FMT_SMF.1	2022.03.21	Yes
TD0597	<a href="#">VPN GW Ipv6 Protocol Support</a>	FPP_RUL_EXT.1.6, MOD VPNGW SD v1.1	2021.08.26	Yes
TD0595	<a href="#">Administrative corrections to IPS PP-Module</a>	FAU_GEN.1.1/IPS, Table 4	2021.06.14	Yes
TD0592	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Local Storage of Audit Records</a>	FAU_STG	2021.05.21	Yes
TD0591	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Virtual TOEs and hypervisors</a>	A.LIMITED_FUNCTIONALITY, ACRONYMS	2021.05.21	No

ITEM	TITLE	REFERENCE	PUBLICATION DATE	Relevant to ST
TD0590	<a href="#">Mapping of operational environment objectives</a>	Section 4.3	2021.05.12	Yes
TD0581	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Elliptic curve-based key establishment and NIST SP 800-56Arev3</a>	FCS_CKM.2	2021.04.09	Yes
TD0580	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for clarification about use of DH14 in NDcPPv2.2e</a>	FCS_CKM.1.1, FCS_CKM.2.1	2021.04.09	Yes
TD0572	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Restricting FTP_ITC.1 to only IP address identifiers</a>	FTP_ITC.1	2021.01.29	Yes
TD0571	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Guidance on how to handle FIA_AFL.1</a>	FIA_UAU.1, FIA_PMG_EXT.1	2021.01.29	Yes
TD0570	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Clarification about FIA_AFL.1</a>	FIA_AFL.1	2021.01.29	Yes
TD0569	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Session ID Usage Conflict in FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1.7</a>	FCS_DTLSS_EXT.1. 7, FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4	2021.01.28	No
TD0564	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Vulnerability Analysis Search Criteria</a>	AVA_VAN.1	2021.01.28	Yes
TD0563	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Clarification of audit date information</a>	FAU_GEN.1.2	2021.01.28	Yes
TD0556	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for RFC 5077 question</a>	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4, Test 3	2020.11.06	No
TD0555	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for RFC Reference incorrect in TLSS Test</a>	FCS_TLSS_EXT.1.4, Test 3	2020.11.06	No
TD0553	FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1.4 and MAC control frames	FCS_MACSEC_EXT. 1.4	2020.12.18	Yes
TD0551	NIT Technical Decision for Incomplete Mappings of Oes in FW Module v1.4+Errata	Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.4	2020.10.02	Yes
TD0549	Consistency of Security Problem Definition update for MOD_VPNGW_v1.0 and MOD_VPNGW_v1.1	Section 6.1.2	2020.10.15	Yes
TD0547	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Clarification on developer disclosure of AVA_VAN</a>	AVA_VAN.1	2020.10.15	Yes



ITEM	TITLE	REFERENCE	PUBLICATION DATE	Relevant to ST
TD0546	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for DTLSC - clarification of Application Note 63</a>	FCS_DTLSC_EXT.1.1	2020.10.15	No
TD0545	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Conflicting FW rules cannot be configured (extension of Rfl#201837)</a>	FFW_RUL_EXT.1.8	2020.10.15	Yes
TD0538	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Outdated link to allowed-with list</a>	Section 2	2020.07.13	Yes
TD0537	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Incorrect reference to FCS_TLSC_EXT.2.3</a>	FIA_X509_EXT.2.2	2020.07.13	Yes
TD0536	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Update Verification Inconsistency</a>	AGD_OPE.1	2020.07.13	Yes
TD0528	<a href="#">NIT Technical Decision for Missing EAs for FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4</a>	FCS_NTP_EXT.1.4	2020.07.13	Yes
TD0527	<a href="#">Updates to Certificate Revocation Testing (FIA_X509_EXT.1)</a>	FIA_X509_EXT.1/REV, FIA_X509_EXT.1/ITT	2020.07.01	Yes
TD0509	<a href="#">Correction to MACsec Audit</a>	FAU_GEN.1	2020.03.02	Yes
TD0487	Correction to Typo in FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4	FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.4	2020.01.02	Yes
TD0273	Rekey after CAK expiration	FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4	2017.12.20	Yes
TD0190	FPT_FLS.1(2)/SelfTest Failure with Preservation of Secure State and Modular Network Devices	FPT_FLS.1(2)/SelfTest	2017.04.11	Yes
TD0135	NMP in NDcPP MACsec EP v1.2	FMT_SNMP_EXT.1.1, FCS_SNMP_EXT.1.1	2017.01.25	No

Table 3 Applicable NIAP Technical Decisions

### 2.3.2 Other technical decisions

36. All other NIAP Technical Decisions fall into one of the following categories and hence are not applicable to this TOE:

- Relates to earlier version of PPs/MODs claimed for this TOE. This TD has been superseded by PPs/MODs (and associated SDs) released after this TD
- Relates to PPs/MODs that are not claimed for this TOE

### 3 Security Problem Definition

37. As this TOE is not distributed, none of the threats/assumptions/OSPs relating to distributed TOEs are specified for this TOE.

#### 3.1 Threats

38. The following threats for this TOE are as defined in [CPP\_ND], which also apply to [MOD\_CPP\_FW], [MOD\_VPNGW], [MOD\_IPS] and [MACSEC]. Namely:

- T.UNAUTHORIZED\_ADMINISTRATOR\_ACCESS

Threat agents may attempt to gain Administrator access to the network device by nefarious means such as masquerading as an Administrator to the device, masquerading as the device to an Administrator, replaying an administrative session (in its entirety, or selected portions), or performing man-in-the-middle attacks, which would provide access to the administrative session, or sessions between network devices. Successfully gaining Administrator access allows malicious actions that compromise the security functionality of the device and the network on which it resides.

- T.WEAK\_CRYPTOGRAPHY

Threat agents may exploit weak cryptographic algorithms or perform a cryptographic exhaust against the key space. Poorly chosen encryption algorithms, modes, and key sizes will allow attackers to compromise the algorithms, or brute force exhaust the key space and give them unauthorized access allowing them to read, manipulate and/or control the traffic with minimal effort.

- T.UNTRUSTED\_COMMUNICATION\_CHANNELS

Threat agents may attempt to target network devices that do not use standardized secure tunnelling protocols to protect the critical network traffic. Attackers may take advantage of poorly designed protocols or poor key management to successfully perform man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc. Successful attacks will result in loss of confidentiality and integrity of the critical network traffic, and potentially could lead to a compromise of the network device itself.

- T.WEAK\_AUTHENTICATION\_ENDPOINTS

Threat agents may take advantage of secure protocols that use weak methods to authenticate the endpoints – e.g. a shared password that is guessable or transported as plaintext. The consequences are the same as a poorly designed protocol, the attacker could masquerade as the Administrator or another device, and the attacker could insert themselves into the network stream and perform a man-in-the-middle attack. The result is the critical network traffic is exposed and there could be a loss of confidentiality and integrity, and potentially the network device itself could be compromised.

- T.UPDATE\_COMPROMISE

Threat agents may attempt to provide a compromised update of the software or firmware which undermines the security functionality of the device. Non-validated updates or updates validated using non-secure or weak cryptography leave the update firmware vulnerable to surreptitious alteration.

- T.UNDETECTED\_ACTIVITY

Threat agents may attempt to access, change, and/or modify the security functionality of the network device without Administrator awareness. This could result in the attacker finding an

avenue (e.g., misconfiguration, flaw in the product) to compromise the device and the Administrator would have no knowledge that the device has been compromised.

- T.SECURITY\_FUNCTIONALITY\_COMPROMISE

Threat agents may compromise credentials and device data enabling continued access to the network device and its critical data. The compromise of credentials includes replacing existing credentials with an attacker's credentials, modifying existing credentials, or obtaining the Administrator or device credentials for use by the attacker.

- T.PASSWORD\_CRACKING

Threat agents may be able to take advantage of weak administrative passwords to gain privileged access to the device. Having privileged access to the device provides the attacker unfettered access to the network traffic and may allow them to take advantage of any trust relationships with other network devices.

- T.SECURITY\_FUNCTIONALITY\_FAILURE

An external, unauthorized entity could make use of failed or compromised security functionality and might therefore subsequently use or abuse security functions without prior authentication to access, change or modify device data, critical network traffic or security functionality of the device.

39. The following additional threats specified in [MOD\_CPP\_FW], [MOD\_IPS], [MOD\_VPNGW] and [MACSEC] are also detailed for this TOE:

- T.NETWORK\_ACCESS<sup>1</sup>

Devices located outside the protected network may seek to exercise services located on the protected network that are intended to only be accessed from inside the protected network or only accessed by entities using an authenticated path into the protected network. Devices located outside the protected network may, likewise, offer services that are inappropriate for access from within the protected network.

From an ingress perspective, VPN gateways can be configured so that only those network servers intended for external consumption by entities operating on a trusted network (e.g., machines operating on a network where the peer VPN gateways are supporting the connection) are accessible and only via the intended ports. This serves to mitigate the potential for network entities outside a protected network to access network servers or services intended only for consumption or access inside a protected network.

From an egress perspective, VPN gateways can be configured so that only specific external services (e.g., based on destination port) can be accessed from within a protected network, or moreover are accessed via an encrypted channel. For example, access to external mail services can be blocked to enforce corporate policies against accessing uncontrolled e-mail servers, or, that access to the mail server must be done over an encrypted link.

40. The following additional threats specified in [MOD\_CPP\_FW], [MOD\_IPS] and [MOD\_VPNGW] are also detailed for this TOE:

- T.NETWORK\_DISCLOSURE<sup>2</sup>

Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to conduct unauthorized activities. If

---

<sup>1</sup> Wording from [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>2</sup> Wording from [MOD\_VPNGW]

known malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network, or if devices on the protected network can establish communications with those external devices (e.g., as a result of a phishing episode or by inadvertent responses to email messages), then those internal devices may be susceptible to the unauthorized disclosure of information.

From an infiltration perspective, VPN gateways serve not only to limit access to only specific destination network addresses and ports within a protected network, but whether network traffic will be encrypted or transmitted in plaintext. With these limits, general network port scanning can be prevented from reaching protected networks or machines, and access to information on a protected network can be limited to that obtainable from specifically configured ports on identified network nodes (e.g., web pages from a designated corporate web server). Additionally, access can be limited to only specific source addresses and ports so that specific networks or network nodes can be blocked from accessing a protected network thereby further limiting the potential disclosure of information.

From an exfiltration perspective, VPN gateways serve to limit how network nodes operating on a protected network can connect to and communicate with other networks limiting how and where they can disseminate information. Specific external networks can be blocked altogether or egress could be limited to specific addresses and/or ports. Alternately, egress options available to network nodes on a protected network can be carefully managed in order to, for example, ensure that outgoing connections are encrypted to further mitigate inappropriate disclosure of data through packet sniffing.

- T.NETWORK\_MISUSE<sup>3</sup>

Devices located outside the protected network, while permitted to access particular public services offered inside the protected network, may attempt to conduct inappropriate activities while communicating with those allowed public services. Certain services offered from within a protected network may also represent a risk when accessed from outside the protected network.

From an ingress perspective, it is generally assumed that entities operating on external networks are not bound by the use policies for a given protected network. Nonetheless, VPN gateways can log policy violations that might indicate violation of publicized usage statements for publicly available services.

From an egress perspective, VPN gateways can be configured to help enforce and monitor protected network use policies. As explained in the other threats, a VPN gateway can serve to limit dissemination of data, access to external servers, and even disruption of services—all of these could be related to the use policies of a protected network and as such are subject in some regards to enforcement. Additionally, VPN gateways can be configured to log network usages that cross between protected and external networks and as a result can serve to identify potential usage policy violations

41.

42. The following threat specified in [MOD\_CPP\_FW] only is also applicable to this TOE:

- T.MALICIOUS\_TRAFFIC

---

<sup>3</sup> Wording from [MOD\_VPNGW]

An attacker may attempt to send malformed packets to a machine in hopes of causing the network stack or services listening on UDP/TCP ports of the target machine to crash.

43. Additionally, the following threat specified in [MOD\_IPS] only is applicable to the TOE:

- T.NETWORK\_DOS

Attacks against services inside a protected network, or indirectly by virtue of access to malicious agents from within a protected network, might lead to denial of services otherwise available within a protected network.

44. The following threats specified in [MOD\_VPNGW] and [MACSEC] are also applicable to the TOE:

- T.DATA\_INTEGRITY

Devices on a protected network may be exposed to threats presented by devices located outside the protected network, which may attempt to modify the data without authorization. If known malicious external devices are able to communicate with devices on the protected network or if devices on the protected network can communicate with those external devices then the data contained within the communications may be susceptible to a loss of integrity.

45. The following threats specified in [MOD\_VPNGW] only is also applicable to the TOE:

- T.REPLAY\_ATTACK

If an unauthorized individual successfully gains access to the system, the adversary may have the opportunity to conduct a “replay” attack. This method of attack allows the individual to capture packets traversing throughout the network and send the packets at a later time, possibly unknown by the intended receiver. Traffic is subject to replay if it meets the following conditions:

- Cleartext: an attacker with the ability to view unencrypted traffic can identify an appropriate segment of the communications to replay as well in order to cause the desired outcome.
- No integrity: alongside cleartext traffic, an attacker can make arbitrary modifications to captured traffic and replay it to cause the desired outcome if the recipient has no means to detect these modifications.

46. No threats are identified for this TOE in addition to those specified in the collaborative Protection Profile, PP-Modules and EP that the ST claims conformance to.

## 3.2 Assumptions

47. The assumptions made for this TOE are as defined in [CPP\_ND], namely:

- A.PHYSICAL\_PROTECTION

The network device is assumed to be physically protected in its operational environment and not subject to physical attacks that compromise the security and/or interfere with the device’s physical interconnections and correct operation. This protection is assumed to be sufficient to protect the device and the data it contains. As a result, the cPP will not include any requirements on physical tamper protection or other physical attack mitigations. The cPP will not expect the product to defend against physical access to the device that allows unauthorized entities to extract data, bypass other controls, or otherwise manipulate the device.

- A.LIMITED\_FUNCTIONALITY

The device is assumed to provide networking functionality as its core function and not provide functionality/services that could be deemed as general-purpose computing. For example, the device should not provide a computing platform for general purpose applications (unrelated to networking functionality).

- A.TRUSTED\_ADMINISTRATOR

The Security Administrator(s) for the network device are assumed to be trusted and to act in the best interest of security for the organization. This includes being appropriately trained, following policy, and adhering to guidance documentation. Administrators are trusted to ensure passwords/credentials have sufficient strength and entropy and to lack malicious intent when administering the device. The network device is not expected to be capable of defending against a malicious Administrator that actively works to bypass or compromise the security of the device.

For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are expected to fully validate (e.g. offline verification) any CA certificate (root CA certificate or intermediate CA certificate) loaded into the TOE's trust store (aka 'root store', 'trusted CA Key Store', or similar) as a trust anchor prior to use (e.g. offline verification).

- A.REGULAR\_UPDATES

The network device firmware and software is assumed to be updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

- A.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE

The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the network device are protected by the platform on which they reside.

- A.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION

The Administrator must ensure that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

- A.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION

This assumption is only applicable to interfaces in the TOE that are defined by the [CPP\_ND]. For these interfaces, the TOE does not provide any assurance regarding the protection of traffic that traverses it.

The following assumption A.CONNECTIONS is introduced through compliance to [MOD\_VPNGW] and [MOD\_IPS]. It is typically understood that an ST claiming exact compliance to a Protection Profile cannot introduce assumptions. However, that is on the understanding this limits applicability of the security functional requirements for the TOE, whereas this assumption is a clarification of how the TOE is to be connected to distinct networks.

- A.CONNECTIONS

It is assumed that the TOE is connected to distinct networks in a manner that ensures that the TOE security policies will be enforced on all applicable network traffic flowing among the attached networks.

48. No assumptions are identified for this TOE in addition to those specified in the collaborative Protection Profile, PP-modules and EP .

### 3.3 Organizational Security Policies

49. The OSP P.ACCESS\_BANNER applied for this TOE is as defined in [CPP\_ND] Section 4.3. The OSP P.ANALYZE applied for this TOE is as defined in [MOD\_IPS] Section A.1.3. No additional OSPs are identified and no modification to the statement of OSPs is made for this TOE.

- P.ACCESS\_BANNER

The TOE shall display an initial banner describing restrictions of use, legal agreements, or any other appropriate information to which users consent by accessing the TOE.

- P.ANALYZE

Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about potential intrusions must be applied to IPS data and appropriate response actions taken.

## 4 Security Objectives

50. As this TOE is not distributed, none of the objectives relating to distributed TOEs are specified for this TOE.

### 4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE

51. The security objectives for the TOE are trivially determined through the inverse of the statement of threats presented in [CPP\_ND].

52. These are augmented by the statement of security objectives for the TOE in relation to the IPS capabilities as detailed in [MOD\_IPS] Tabel A-5, namely:

- O.SYSTEM\_MONITORING

To be able to analyze and react to potential network policy violations, the IPS must be able to collect and store essential data elements of network traffic on monitored networks.

- O.IPS\_ANALYZE

Entities that reside on or communicate across monitored networks must have network activity effectively analyzed for potential violations of approved network usage. The TOE must be able to effectively analyze data collected from monitored networks to reduce the risk of unauthorized disclosure of information, inappropriate access to services, and misuse of network resources.

- O.IPS\_REACT

The TOE must be able to react in real-time as configured by the Security Administrator to terminate and block traffic flows that have been determined to violate administrator-defined IPS policies.

- O.TOE\_ADMINISTRATION

The To address the threat of unauthorized administrator access that is defined in the Base-PP, conformant TOEs will provide the functions necessary for an administrator to configure the IPS capabilities of the TOE.

53. These are further augmented by the statement of security objectives for the TOE in relation to the Packet Filtering capabilities as detailed in [MOD\_CPP\_FW] Section 5.1, namely

- O.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION

The TOE shall implement measures to ensure that any previous information content of network packets sent through the TOE is made unavailable either upon deallocation of the memory area containing the network packet or upon allocation of a memory area for a newly arriving network packet or both.

- O.STATEFUL\_TRAFFIC\_FILTERING

The TOE shall perform stateful traffic filtering on network packets that it processes. For this the TOE shall support the definition of stateful traffic filtering rules that allow to permit or drop network packets. The TOE shall support assignment of the stateful traffic filtering rules to each distinct network interface. The TOE shall support the processing of the applicable stateful traffic filtering rules in an administratively defined order. The TOE shall deny the flow of network packets if no matching stateful traffic filtering rule is identified.

Depending on the implementation, the TOE might support the stateful traffic filtering of Dynamic Protocols (optional).



54. These are further augmented by the statement of security objectives for the TOE in relation to the IPS capabilities as detailed in [MOD\_VPNGW] Section 4.1, namely:

- O.ADDRESS\_FILTERING

To address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption or denial of services, and network-based reconnaissance, compliant TOE's will implement Packet Filtering capability. That capability will restrict the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on network addresses of the network nodes originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) applicable network traffic as well as on established connection information.

- O.AUTHENTICATION – as also defined by the inverse of the threats defined in [CPP\_ND] Section 4.1

To further address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, a compliant TOE's authentication ability (IPSec) will allow a VPN peer to establish VPN connectivity with another VPN peer and ensure that any such connection attempt is both authenticated and authorized. VPN endpoints authenticate each other to ensure they are communicating with an authorized external IT entity.

- O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC\_FUNCTIONS – as also defined by the inverse of the threats defined in [CPP\_ND] Section 4.1

To address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, inappropriate access to services, misuse of services, disruption of services, and network-based reconnaissance, compliant TOEs will implement cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities are intended to maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.

- O.FAIL\_SECURE

There may be instances where the TOE's hardware malfunctions or the integrity of the TOE's software is compromised, the latter being due to malicious or non-malicious intent. To address the concern of the TOE operating outside of its hardware or software specification, the TOE will shut down upon discovery of a problem reported via the self-test mechanism and provide signature-based validation of updates to the TSF.

- O.PORT\_FILTERING

To further address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, etc., a compliant TOE's port filtering capability will restrict the flow of network traffic between protected networks and other attached networks based on the originating (source) and/or receiving (destination) port (or service) identified in the network traffic as well as on established connection information.

- O.SYSTEM\_MONITORING – as also defined by the inverse of the threats defined in [CPP\_ND] Section 4.1

To address the issues of administrators being able to monitor the operations of the VPN gateway, it is necessary to provide a capability to monitor system activity. Compliant TOEs will implement the ability to log the flow of network traffic. Specifically, the TOE will provide the means for administrators to configure packet filtering rules to 'log' when network traffic is found to match the configured rule. As a result, matching a rule configured to 'log' will result in informative event logs whenever a match occurs. In addition, the establishment of security associations (SAs) is auditable, not only between peer VPN gateways, but also with certification authorities (CAs).

- O.TOE\_ADMINISTRATION – as also defined by the inverse of the threats defined in [CPP\_ND] Section 4.1

Compliant TOEs will provide the functions necessary for an administrator to configure the packet filtering rules, as well as the cryptographic aspects of the IPsec protocol that are enforced by the TOE.

55. The following additional security objectives for the TOE are stated in [MACSEC]:

- O.CRYPTOGRAPHIC\_FUNCTIONS Data Encryption and Decryption

To address the issues associated with unauthorized modification and disclosure of information, compliant TOEs will implement cryptographic capabilities. These capabilities are intended to maintain confidentiality and allow for detection and modification of data that is transmitted outside of the TOE.

- O.AUTHENTICATION Authentication

To further address the issues associated with unauthorized disclosure of information, a compliant TOE's authentication ability (MKA) will allow a MACsec peer to establish connectivity associations (CA) with another MACsec peer. MACsec endpoints authenticate each other to ensure they are communicating with an authorized SecY entity (SeY).

- O.PORT\_FILTERING Port-Based Filtering

To further address the issues associated with unauthorized network access, a compliant TOE's port filtering capability will restrict the flow of network traffic through the TOE based on source address/port and whether or not the traffic represents valid MACsec frames and MACsec Key Agreement Protocol Data Unit( MKPDU)s.

- O.SYSTEM\_MONITORING System Monitoring

To address the issues of administrators being able to monitor the operations of the MACsec device, compliant TOEs will implement the ability to log the flow of Ethernet traffic. Specifically, the TOE will provide the means for administrators to configure rules to 'log' when Ethernet traffic grants or restricts access. As a result, the 'log' will result in informative event logs whenever a match occurs. In addition, the establishment of security CAs is auditable, not only between MACsec devices, but also with MAC Security Key Agreement Entities (KaYs).

- O.AUTHORIZED\_ADMINISTRATION Authorized Administration

All network devices are expected to provide services that allow the security functionality of the device to be managed. The MACsec device, as a specific type of network device, has a refined set of management functions to address its specialized behavior. In order to further mitigate the threat of a compromise of its security functionality, the MACsec device prescribes the ability to limit brute-force authentication attempts by enforcing lockout of accounts that experience excessive failures and by limiting access to security-relevant data that administrators do not need to view.

- O.TSF\_INTEGRITY TSF Integrity

To mitigate the security risk that the MACsec device may fail during startup, it is required to shut down in the event that any self-test failures occur during startup. This ensures that the device will only operate when it is in a known state.

- O.REPLAY\_DETECTION Replay Detection

A MACsec device is expected to help mitigate the threat of MACsec data integrity violations by providing a mechanism to detect and discard replayed traffic for MACsec protocol data units (MPDUs).

- O.VERIFIABLE\_UPDATES Verifiable Updates

To ensure the authenticity and integrity of software/firmware updates that are loaded onto the MACsec device, it is necessary to provide a mechanism for validating these updates prior to application. The NDcPP provides methods of update verification; this EP specifically requires that a signature-based mechanism be used at minimum.

## 4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

56. The statement of security objectives for the operational environment of this TOE is as defined in [CPP\_ND] Section 5.1, [MOD\_VPNGW] Section 4.2 and [MOD\_IPS] Section A.2.2 namely:

- OE.PHYSICAL

Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.

- OE.NO\_GENERAL\_PURPOSE

There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g., compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other than those services necessary for the operation, administration and support of the TOE.

- OE.TRUSTED\_ADMIN

Security Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all guidance documentation in a trusted manner.

For TOEs supporting X.509v3 certificate-based authentication, the Security Administrator(s) are assumed to monitor the revocation status of all certificates in the TOE's trust store and to remove any certificate from the TOE's trust store in case such certificate can no longer be trusted.

- OE.UPDATES

The TOE firmware and software is updated by an Administrator on a regular basis in response to the release of product updates due to known vulnerabilities.

- OE.ADMIN\_CREDENTIALS\_SECURE

The Administrator's credentials (private key) used to access the TOE must be protected on any other platform on which they reside.

- OE.RESIDUAL\_INFORMATION

The Security Administrator ensures that there is no unauthorized access possible for sensitive residual information (e.g. cryptographic keys, keying material, PINs, passwords etc.) on networking equipment when the equipment is discarded or removed from its operational environment.

- OE.CONNECTIONS

TOE administrators will ensure that the TOE is installed in a manner that will allow the TOE to effectively enforce its policies on network traffic of monitored networks.

- OE.NO\_THRU\_TRAFFIC\_PROTECTION

Except for interfaces covered by the MOD\_CPP\_FW, MOD\_VPNGW or MOD\_IPS, the TOE does not provide any protection of traffic that traverses it.

### 4.3 Security Objectives rationale

57. As these objectives for the TOE and operational environment are the same as those specified in [CPP\_ND], [MOD\_CPP\_FW], [MOD\_VPNGW] and [MOD\_IPS], the rationales provided in the prose of the following are wholly applicable to this security target as the statements of threats, assumptions, OSPs and security objectives provided in this security target are the same as those defined in the collaborative Protection Profile, and PP-Modules to which this ST claims conformance

- [CPP\_ND] section 4
- [MOD\_CPP\_FW], section 5.3
- [MOD\_IPS] section 4 & Annex A.2
- [MOD\_VPNGW] and section 4.3
- [MACSEC] section 2, section 3 & Annex A

## 5 Security Functional Requirements

58. All security functional requirements are taken from the [CPP\_ND] collaborative Protection Profile and from the [MOD\_CPP\_FW], [MOD\_IPS], [MACSEC] and [MOD\_VPNGW].
59. The Security Functional requirements are primarily structured according to [CPP\_ND], with requirements and operations from [MOD\_CPP\_FW], [MOD\_IPS], [MACSEC] and [MOD\_VPNGW] inserted as appropriate. The SFRs are presented in accordance with the conventions described in [CPP\_ND] Section 6.1, and section 1.4 of this document.
60. As this TOE is not distributed, none of the security functional requirements relating to distributed TOEs are specified for this TOE.

### 5.1 Security Audit (FAU)

#### 5.1.1 Security Audit Data generation (FAU\_GEN)

##### 5.1.1.1 FAU\_GEN.1 Audit data generation

#### FAU\_GEN.1/ND Network Device Audit Data Generation

FAU\_GEN.1.1/ND The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and
- c) All administrative actions comprising:
  - *Administrative login and logout (name of user account shall be logged if individual user accounts are required for Administrators).*
  - *Changes to TSF data related to configuration changes (in addition to the information that a change occurred it shall be logged what has been changed).*
  - *Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (in addition to the action itself a unique key name or key reference shall be logged).*
  - *Resetting passwords (name of related user account shall be logged).*
  - [
    - *Starting and stopping services,*
    - *Cluster Mode configuration and management,*
    - *Synchronization of the kernel state between the two Routing Engines configured in Cluster Mode.*];
- d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 4.

#### **ST Application Note:**

The “Services” referenced in the above requirement relate to the trusted communication channel to the external syslog server (netconf over SSH) and the trusted path for remote administrative sessions (SSH, which can be tunneled over IPsec).

**FAU\_GEN.1.2/ND** The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the ST, *information specified in column three of Table 4.*

Requirement	Auditable Events	Additional Audit Record Contents
FAU_GEN.1	None	None
FAU_GEN.2	None	None
FAU_STG_EXT.1	None	None
FAU_STG.1	None	None
FCS_CKM.1	None	None
FCS_CKM.2	None	None
FCS_CKM.4	None	None
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	None	None
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	None	None
FCS_COP.1/Hash	None	None
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	None	None
FCS_NTP_EXT.1	Configuration of a new time server Removal of configured time server	Identity if new/removed time server
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None	None
FDP_RIP.2 <sup>4</sup>	None	None
FIA_AFL.1	Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None	None
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Provided user identity, origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	All use of identification and authentication mechanism.	Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).
FIA_UAU.7	None	None
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	Any attempt to initiate a manual update	None
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	All management activities of TSF data	None
FMT_SMF.1/IPS	None	None
FMT_SMF.1/ND	None	None
FMT_SMF.1/FFW <sup>5</sup>	All management activities of TSF data (including creation, modification and deletion of firewall rules).	None
FMT_SMR.2	None	None
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None	None
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None	None
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None	None
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	Initiation of update; result of the update attempt (success or failure)	None.
FPT_STM_EXT.1	Discontinuous changes to time - either Administrator actuated or changed via an automated process.	For discontinuous changes to time: The old and new values for the time. Origin of the attempt to change

---

<sup>4</sup> As per [MOD\_CPP\_FW]

<sup>5</sup> As per [MOD\_CPP\_FW]

		time for success and failure (e.g., IP address).
FTA_SSL_EXT.1 (if “terminate the session” is selected)	The termination of a local interactive session by the session locking mechanism.	None.
FTA_SSL.3	The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.	None
FTA_SSL.4	The termination of an interactive session.	None
FTA_TAB.1	None	None
FTP_ITC.1	Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.	Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	Initiation of the trusted path. Termination of the trusted path. Failure of the trusted path functions.	None.
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	Failure to establish an SSH session	Reason for failure
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	Unsuccessful attempt to validate a certificate. Any addition, replacement or removal of trust anchors in the TOE's trust store.	Reason for failure of certificate validation. Identification of certificates added, replaced or removed as trust anchor in the TOE's trust store.
FIA_X509_EXT.2	None	None
FIA_X509_EXT.3	None	None
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	Modification of the behaviour of the transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, the handling of audit data, the audit functionality when Local Audit Storage Space is full.	None.
FMT_MOF.1/Services	Starting and stopping of services.	None
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	Management of cryptographic keys.	None.
FFW_RUL_EXT.1 <sup>6</sup>	Application of rules configured with the ‘log’ operation	Source and destination addresses Source and destination ports Transport Layer Protocol TOE Interface
FFW_RUL_EXT.2 <sup>7</sup>	Dynamical definition of rule Establishment of a session	None
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 <sup>8</sup>	Session Establishment with peer	Entire packet contents of packets transmitted/received

<sup>6</sup> As per [MOD\_CPP\_FW]

<sup>7</sup> As per [MOD\_CPP\_FW]

<sup>8</sup> As per [MOD\_VPNGW]

		during session establishment
FIA_X509_EXT.1	Session establishment with CA	Entire packet contents of packets transmitted/received during session establishment
FPF_RUL_EXT.1 <sup>9</sup>	Application of rules configured with the 'log' operation	Source and destination addresses Source and destination ports Transport Layer Protocol
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.1	Session Establishment	Secure Channel Identified (SCI)
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.4.4 <sup>10</sup>	Creation of Connectivity Association	Connectivity Association Key Names
FCS_MACSEC_EXT.3.1	Creation and Update of Security Association Key	Creation and update times
FIA_AFL.1	Administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures	None
FPT_RPL.1	Detected replay attempt	None

Table 4 FAU\_GEN.1 Security Functional Requirements and Auditable Events<sup>11</sup>**FAU\_GEN.1/IPS IPS Audit Data Generation<sup>12</sup>**

**FAU\_GEN.1.1/IPS** The TSF shall be able to generate an **IPS** audit record of the following IPS auditable events:

- Start-up and shut-down of the IPS functions;
- All **IPS** auditable events for the [not specified] level of audit; and
- [All dissimilar IPS events;
- All dissimilar IPS reactions;
- Totals of similar events occurring within a specified time period;
- Totals of similar reactions occurring within a specified time period
- The events in the IPS Events table.
- [no other auditable events.]

**FAU\_GEN.1.2/IPS** The TSF shall record within each **IPS auditable event** record at least the following information:

- Date and time of the event, type of event **and/or reaction**; ~~subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event;~~ and
- For each **IPS auditable** event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [information specified in column three of the IPS Events table ].

Requirement	IPS Auditable Events	Additional Details
FMT_SMF.1/IPS	Modification of an IPS policy element.	Identifier or name of the modified IPS policy element (e.g.

<sup>9</sup> As per [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>10</sup> In accordance with TD0509

<sup>11</sup> Includes also audit evens from [MOD\_VPNGW], [MACSEC] and [MOD\_CPP\_FW]

<sup>12</sup> As per [MOD\_IPS].



		which signature, baseline, or known-good/known-bad list was modified.
IPS_ABD_EXT.1	Inspected traffic matches an anomaly-based IPS policy.	Source and destination IP addresses.
		The content of the header fields that were determined to match the policy.
		TOE interface that received the packet.
		Aspect of the anomaly-based IPS policy rule that triggered the event (e.g. throughput, time of day, frequency, etc.).
		Network-based action by the TOE (e.g. allowed, blocked, sent reset to source IP, sent blocking notification to firewall).
IPS_IPB_EXT.1	Inspected traffic matches a list of known-good or known-bad addresses applied to an IPS policy.	Source and destination IP addresses (and, if applicable, indication of whether the source and/or destination address matched the list).
		TOE interface that received the packet.
		Network-based action by the TOE (e.g. allowed, blocked, sent reset)
IPS_NTA_EXT.1	Modification of which IPS policies are active on a TOE interface. Enabling/disabling a TOE interface with IPS policies applied. Modification of which mode(s) is/are active on a TOE interface.	Identification of the TOE interface
		The IPS policy and interface mode (if applicable).
IPS_SBD_EXT.1	Inspected traffic matches a signature-based IPS with logging enabled.	Name or identifier of the matched signature.
		Source and destination IP addresses.
		The content of the header fields that were determined to match the signature.
		TOE interface that received the packet.
		Network-based action by the TOE (e.g. allowed, blocked, sent reset)

Table 5 IPS Events [MOD\_IPS]

### 5.1.1.2 FAU\_GEN.2 User identity association

#### FAU\_GEN.2 User identity association

**FAU\_GEN.2.1** For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

### 5.1.2 Security audit event storage (Extended – FAU\_STG\_EXT)

#### 5.1.2.1 FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

#### FAU\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Audit Event Storage

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be able to transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity using a trusted channel according to FTP\_ITC.1.

#### **ST Application Note**

Transfer of the audit data to the external server is performed automatically (without further Security Administrator intervention) in the evaluated deployment.

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall be able to store generated audit data on the TOE itself. In addition [TOE shall consist of a single standalone component that stores audit data locally.].

**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall [overwrite previous audit records according to the following rule: *[oldest log is overwritten]*] when the local storage space for audit data is full.

#### 5.1.2.2 FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage (Optional)

#### FAU\_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage

**FAU\_STG.1.1** The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.

**FAU\_STG.1.2** The TSF shall be able to prevent unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

## 5.2 Cryptographic Support (FCS)

### 5.2.1 Cryptographic Key Management (FCS\_CKM)

#### 5.2.1.1 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement)

#### FCS\_CKM.1/ND Cryptographic Key Generation/ND

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/ND** The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm: [

- *RSA schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3;*
- *ECC schemes using “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521] that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4;*
- *FFC schemes using cryptographic key sizes of 2048-bit or greater that meet the following: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.1*
- *FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [RFC 3526].*

*]and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].*

### 5.2.1.2 FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (Refinement)

#### FCS\_CKM.1/IKE Cryptographic Key Generation (for IKE Peer Authentication)<sup>13</sup>

**FCS\_CKM.1.1/IKE** The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys **used for IKE peer authentication** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [

- *FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.3 for RSA schemes;*
  - *FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Appendix B.4 for ECDSA schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [no other curves]]*
- and
- *[no other key generation algorithms]*

and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key strength of 112 bits.

### 5.2.1.3 FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment (Refinement)

#### FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Establishment

**FCS\_CKM.2.1** The TSF shall **perform** cryptographic **key establishment** in accordance with a specified cryptographic key **establishment** method: [

- *Elliptic curve-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”<sup>14</sup>;*
- *Finite field-based key establishment schemes that meet the following: NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 2, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography”;*
- *FFC Schemes using ‘safe-prime’ groups that meet the following: “NIST Special Publication 800-56A Revision 3, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” and [groups listed in RFC 3526]<sup>15</sup>.*

] that meets the following: ~~[assignment: list of standards]~~.

### 5.2.1.4 FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

#### FCS\_CKM.4 Cryptographic Key Destruction

**FCS\_CKM.4.1** The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method

- *For plaintext keys in volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by a [destruction of reference to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection];*
- *For plaintext keys in non-volatile storage, the destruction shall be executed by the invocation of an interface provided by a part of the TSF that [*
  - *logically addresses the storage location of the key and performs a [single overwrite consisting of [zeros]]*

that meets the following: *No Standard*.

<sup>13</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>14</sup> As per TD0581

<sup>15</sup> As per TD0580

## 5.2.2 Cryptographic Operation (FCS\_COP)

### 5.2.2.1 FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

#### FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/DataEncryption**<sup>16</sup> The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in [CBC, GCM] and [CTR] mode and cryptographic key sizes [128 bits, 256 bits] and [192 bits] that meet the following AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, [CBC as specified in ISO 10116, GCM as specified in ISO 19772] and [CTR as specified in ISO 10116].

#### FCS\_COP.1(5) Cryptographic Operation (AES Data Encryption/Decryption)<sup>17</sup>

**FCS\_COP.1.1(5) Refinement:** The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES used in AES Key Wrap, GCM and cryptographic key sizes 128 bits, 256 bits that meet the following: AES as specified in ISO 18033-3, AES Key Wrap in CMAC mode as specified in NIST SP 800-38F, GCM as specified in ISO 19772<sup>18</sup>.

**Application Note:** This EP mandates the use of GCM for MACsec and AES Key Wrap for key distribution so this SFR has been further refined from the NDcPP.

#### FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation and Verification)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen** The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services (generation and verification) in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [

- RSA Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes (modulus) [2048 bits, 3072 bits, 4096 bits],
- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm and cryptographic key sizes [256 bits, 384 bits, 521 bits]

that meet the following: [

- For RSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 5.5, using PKCS #1 v2.1 Signature Schemes RSASSA-PSS and/or RSASSA-PKCS1v1\_5; ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital signature scheme 2 or Digital Signature scheme 3,
- For ECDSA schemes: FIPS PUB 186-4, “Digital Signature Standard (DSS)”, Section 6 and Appendix D, Implementing “NIST curves” [P-256, P-384, P-521]; ISO/IEC 14888-3, Section 6.4

].

#### FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hash Algorithm)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash** The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2004.

#### FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash Algorithm)

**FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyedHash** The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512] and cryptographic key sizes [160, 256, 384 and 512 bits] and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384 and 512] bits that meet the following: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2011, Section 7 “MAC Algorithm 2”.

<sup>16</sup> The wording is as per [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>17</sup> In accordance with [MACSEC]

<sup>18</sup> In accordance with TD0466

## FCS\_COP.1(1)/KeyedHashCMAC Cryptographic Operation (AES-CMAC Keyed Hash Algorithm)

**FCS\_COP.1.1(1)/ KeyedHash:CMAC<sup>19</sup>** Refinement: The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CMAC] and cryptographic key sizes [128, 256 bits] and message digest size of 128 bits that meets NIST SP 800-38B.

**Application Note:** AES-CMAC is a keyed hash function that is used as part of the key derivation function (KDF) that is used for key generation.

### 5.2.3 Random Bit Generation (Extended – FCS\_RBG\_EXT)

#### 5.2.3.1 FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

##### FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 Random Bit Generation

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform all deterministic random bit generation services in accordance with ISO/IEC 18031:2011 using [HMAC\_DRBG (any)].

**FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.2** The deterministic RBG shall be seeded by at least one entropy source that accumulates entropy from [1] software-based noise source, [1] platform-based noise source] with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least equal to the greatest security strength, according to ISO/IEC 18031:2011 Table C.1 “Security Strength Table for Hash Functions”, of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

### 5.2.4 Cryptographic Protocols (Extended – FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT, FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT, FCS\_NTP\_EXT & FCS\_SSHS\_EXT SSH Protocols)

#### 5.2.4.1 FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol

##### FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1 IPsec Protocol

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is otherwise unmatched, and discards it.

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall implement [transport mode, tunnel mode].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4<sup>20</sup>** The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-128 (RFC 3602), AES-CBC-256 (RFC 3602), AES-GCM-128 (RFC 4106), AES-GCM-256 (RFC 4106)] and [AES-CBC-192 (RFC 3602), AES-GCM-192 (RFC 4106)] together with a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC [HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, HMAC-SHA-512].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall implement the protocol [IKEv1, using Main Mode for Phase 1 exchanges, as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109, [no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers], and [RFC 4868 for hash functions];

- IKEv2 as defined in RFC 5996 and [with no support for NAT traversal], and [RFC 4868 for hash functions]

]

<sup>19</sup> As per TD0466

<sup>20</sup> The wording as in [MOD\_VPNGW]

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol uses the cryptographic algorithms [AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-192, AES-CBC-256 (specified in RFC 3602), AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-256 (specified in RFC 5282)].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.7** The TSF shall ensure that [

- *IKEv1 Phase 1 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on [
 
  - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [0.2-24] hours<sup>21</sup>;*
- *];*
- *IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on [
 
  - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [0.2-24] hours*
- *]*

].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall ensure that [

- *IKEv1 Phase 2 SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on [
 
  - number of bytes;
  - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [0.2-24] hours;*
- *];*
- *IKEv2 Child SA lifetimes can be configured by a Security Administrator based on [
 
  - number of bytes;
  - length of time, where the time values can be configured within [0.2-24] hours;*
- *]*

].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.9** The TSF shall generate the secret value  $x$  used in the IKE Diffie-Hellman key exchange (" $x$ " in  $g^x \text{ mod } p$ ) using the random bit generator specified in FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1, and having a length of at least [224 (for DH Group 14), 256 (for DH Groups 19 and 24) and 384 (for DH Group 20)] bits.

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.10** The TSF shall generate nonces used in [IKEv1, IKEv2] exchanges of length [

- *at least 128 bits in size and at least half the output size of the negotiated pseudorandom function (PRF) hash ].*

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11**<sup>22</sup> The TSF shall ensure that IKE protocols implement DH Group(s) [

- [14 (2048-bit MODP)] according to RFC 3526
- [19 (256-bit Random ECP), 20 (384-bit random ECP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS)] according to RFC 5114

].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.12** The TSF shall be able to ensure by default that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv1 Phase 1, IKEv2 IKE\_SA] connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm (in terms of the number of bits in the key) negotiated to protect the [IKEv1 Phase 2, IKEv2 CHILD\_SA] connection.

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.13** The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform peer authentication using [RSA, ECDSA] that use X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and [Pre-shared Keys].

**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.14**<sup>23</sup> The TSF shall only establish a trusted channel if the presented identifier in the received certificate matches the configured reference identifier, where the presented and reference

<sup>21</sup> Length of time can be configured between 180 seconds and 86,400 seconds.

<sup>22</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>23</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

identifiers are of the following fields and types: **Distinguished Name (DN)**, [SAN: IP address, SAN: Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), SAN: user FQDN, **no other reference identifier type**].

#### 5.2.4.2 FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1 MACsec

##### FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1 MACsec<sup>24</sup>

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement MACsec in accordance with IEEE Standard 802.1AE-2006.

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall derive a Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) from a peer's MAC address and port to uniquely identify the originator of a MACsec Protocol Data Unit (MPDU).

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall reject any MPDUs during a given session that contain an SCI other than the one used to establish that session.

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall permit only EAPOL (PAE EtherType 88-8E), MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5), and MAC control frames (EtherType is 88-08) and shall discard others.

#### 5.2.4.3 FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1 NTP Protocol

##### FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1 NTP Protocol

**FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall use only the following NTP version(s) [*NTP v3 (RFC 1305)*, *NTP v4 (RFC 5905)*].

**FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall update its system time using [selection:

- Authentication using [*SHA1, SHA256*] as the message digest algorithm(s);

**FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall not update NTP timestamp from broadcast and/or multicast addresses.

**FCS\_NTP\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall support configuration of at least three (3) NTP time sources in the Operational Environment.

#### 5.2.4.4 FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2 MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality

##### FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2 MACsec Integrity and Confidentiality<sup>25</sup>

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.1** The TOE shall implement MACsec with support for integrity protection with a confidentiality offset of [0, 30, 50].

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.2** The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of protocol data units (MPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived with the Secure Association Key (SAK).

**Application Note:** *The length of the ICV is dependent on the cipher suite used but will not be less than 8 octets or more than 16 octets at the end of the MPDU. The ICV protects the destination and source MAC address parameters, as well as all the fields of the MPDU.*

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2.3** The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a CAK using a KDF.

<sup>24</sup> In accordance with [MACSEC]. TD0553 applied.

<sup>25</sup> In accordance with [MACSEC]

#### 5.2.4.5 FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3 MACsec Randomness<sup>26</sup>

##### FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3 MACsec Randomness

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall generate unique Secure Association Keys (SAKs) using [key derivation from Connectivity Association Key (CAK) per section 9.8.1 of IEEE 802.1X-2010, the TOE's random bit generator as specified by FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1] such that the likelihood of a repeating SAK is no less than 1 in 2 to the power of the size of the generated key.

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall generate unique nonce for the derivation of SAKs using the TOE's random bit generator as specified by FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.

**Application Note:** *FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1 is defined in the NDcPP that this EP extends so a conformant MACsec TOE will claim this SFR.*

#### 5.2.4.6 FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4 MACsec Key Usage<sup>27</sup>

##### FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4 MACsec Key Usage

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.1** The TSF shall support peer authentication using pre-shared keys, [**no other methods**].

**Application Note:** *The definition of the peer's CAK as defined by IEEE 802.1X-2010 is synonymous with the peer authentication performed here. If EAP-TLS is selected, the FCS\_EAP-TLS\_EXT.1 SFR defined in Appendix C.1 must be included in the TSF.*

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.2** The TSF shall distribute SAKs between MACsec peers using AES key wrap as specified in FCS\_COP.1(1).

**Application Note:** *This requirement applies to the SAKs that are generated by the TOE. They must be wrapped by the AES Key Wrap method specified in NIST SP 800-38F.*

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.3** The TSF shall support specifying a lifetime for CAKs.

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.4** The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with CAKs Security Association Key (SAK)<sup>s28</sup> that are defined by the key derivation function using the CAK as input data (per 802.1X, section 9.8.1).

**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4.5** The TSF shall associate Connectivity Association Key Names (CKNs) with CAKs. The length of the CKN shall be an integer number of octets, between 1 and 32 (inclusive).

#### 5.2.4.7 FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1 MACsec Key Agreement<sup>29</sup>

**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement Key Agreement Protocol (MKA) in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-2014.

**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall enable data delay protection for MKA that ensures data frames protected by MACsec are not delayed by more than 2 seconds<sup>30</sup>.

**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall provide assurance of the integrity of MKA protocol data units (MKPDUs) using an Integrity Check Value (ICV) derived from an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK).

**Application Note:** *The ICV has length 128 bits and is computed according to Section 9.4.1 of 802.1X. The ICV protects the destination and source MAC address parameters, as well as all the fields of the*

<sup>26</sup> In accordance with [MACSEC]

<sup>27</sup> In accordance with [MACSEC]

<sup>28</sup> In accordance with TD0487

<sup>29</sup> In accordance with [MACSEC]

<sup>30</sup> In accordance with TD0105



MAC Service Data Unit (MSDU) of the MKPDU including the allocated Ethertype, and up to but not including, the generated ICV.

**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall provide the ability to derive an Integrity Check Value Key (ICK) from a CAK using a KDF.

**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall enforce an MKA Lifetime Timeout limit of 6.0 seconds and Hello Timeout limit of 2.0 seconds.

**Application Note:** The Key Server may distribute a group CAK established by pairwise CAKs.

**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.6** The Key Server shall refresh a SAK when it expires. The Key Server shall distribute a SAK by [pairwise CAKs]. If group CAK is selected, then the Key Server shall distribute a group CAK by [pre-shared key]. If pairwise CAK is selected, then the pairwise CAK shall be [pre-shared key]. The Key Server shall refresh a CAK when it expires.

**Application Note:** If “pairwise CAKs” is selected in the first operation of FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.6, then the third sentence does not apply and may be omitted in the Security Target. If “group CAKs” is selected in the first operation, and “pairwise CAKs” is not selected in the second operation, then the fourth sentence does not apply and may be omitted in the Security Target.

**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.7** The Key Server shall distribute a fresh SAK whenever a member is added to or removed from the live membership of the CA.

**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall validate MKPDUs according to 802.1X, Section 11.11.2. In particular, the TSF shall discard without further processing any MKPDUs to which any of the following conditions apply:

- a) The destination address of the MKPDU was an individual address.
- b) The MKPDU is less than 32 octets long.
- c) The MKPDU is not a multiple of 4 octets long.
- d) The MKPDU comprises fewer octets than indicated by the Basic Parameter Set body length, as encoded in bits 4 through 1 of octet 3 and bits 8 through 1 of octet 4, plus 16 octets of ICV.
- e) The CAK Name is not recognized.

If an MKPDU passes these tests, then the TSF will begin processing it as follows:

- a) If the Algorithm Agility parameter identifies an algorithm that has been implemented by the receiver, the ICV shall be verified as specified in IEEE 802.1x Section 9.4.1.
- b) If the Algorithm Agility parameter is unrecognized or not implemented by the receiver, its value can be recorded for diagnosis but the received MKPDU shall be discarded without further processing. Each received MKPDU that is validated as specified in this clause and verified as specified in 802.1X, section 9.4.1 shall be decoded as specified in 802.1X, section 11.11.4.

#### 5.2.4.8 FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

##### FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1 SSH Server Protocol

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, [5656, 6668].

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based].

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K] bytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following encryption algorithms and rejects all other encryption algorithms: [aes128-cbc, aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr].

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH public-key based authentication implementation uses [ssh-rsa, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521] as its public key algorithm(s) and rejects all other public key algorithms.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512] as its MAC algorithm(s) and rejects all other MAC algorithm(s).

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.7** The TSF shall ensure that [diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256] and [ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall ensure that within SSH connections, the same session keys are used for a threshold of no longer than one hour, and each encryption key is used to protect no more than one gigabyte of data. After any of the thresholds are reached, a rekey needs to be performed.

## 5.3 Identification and Authentication (FIA)

### 5.3.1 Authentication Failure Management (FIA\_AFL)

#### 5.3.1.1 FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management (Refinement)

##### FIA\_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Management

**FIA\_AFL.1.1** The TSF shall detect when an Administrator configurable positive integer within [1 to 10] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to *Administrators attempting to authenticate remotely using a password*.

**FIA\_AFL.1.2** When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF shall [*prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until [Security Administrator has unlocked the account] is taken by an Administrator; prevent the offending Administrator from successfully establishing remote session using any authentication method that involves a password until an Administrator defined time period has elapsed*].

### 5.3.2 Password Management (Extended – FIA\_PMG\_EXT)

#### 5.3.2.1 FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Password Management

##### FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1 Password Management

**FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for administrative passwords:

- a) Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!” , “@” , “#” , “\$” , “%” , “^” , “&” , “\*” , “(” , “)”, [*and all other standard ASCII, extended ASCII and Unicode characters*]];
- b) Minimum password length shall be configurable to **between [10] and [20] characters**.

### 5.3.3 User Identification and Authentication (Extended – FIA\_UIA\_EXT)

#### 5.3.3.1 FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

##### FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1 User Identification and Authentication

**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to initiate the identification and authentication process:

- *Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA\_TAB.1;*
- *[[ICMP echo]].*

**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that administrative user.

### 5.3.4 User authentication (FIA\_UAU) (Extended – FIA\_UAU\_EXT)

#### 5.3.4.1 FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

##### FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2 Password-based Authentication Mechanism

**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall provide a local [password-based] authentication mechanism to perform local administrative user authentication.

#### 5.3.4.2 FIA\_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback

##### FIA\_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback

**FIA\_UAU.7.1** The TSF shall provide only *obscured feedback* to the administrative user while the authentication is in progress **at the local console**.

### 5.3.5 Authentication using X.509 certificates (Extended – FIA\_X509\_EXT)

#### 5.3.5.1 FIA\_X509\_EXT.1 X.509 Certificate Validation

##### FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev X.509 Certificate Validation

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/Rev** The TSF shall validate certificates in accordance with the following rules:

- *RFC 5280 certificate validation and certificate path validation **supporting a minimum path length of three certificates**.*
- *The certification path must terminate with a trusted CA certificate designated as a trust anchor.*
- *The TSF shall validate a certification path by ensuring that all CA certificates in the certification path contain the basicConstraints extension with the CA flag set to TRUE.*
- *The TSF shall validate the revocation status of the certificate using [a Certificate Revocation List (CRL) as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3]*
- *The TSF shall validate the extendedKeyUsage field according to the following rules:*
  - *Certificates used for trusted updates and executable code integrity verification shall have the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
  - *Server certificates presented for TLS shall have the Server Authentication purpose (id-kp 1 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
  - *Client certificates presented for TLS shall have the Client Authentication purpose (id-kp 2 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*
  - *OCSP certificates presented for OCSP responses shall have the OCSP Signing purpose (id-kp 9 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.9) in the extendedKeyUsage field.*

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.2/Rev** The TSF shall only treat a certificate as a CA certificate if the basicConstraints extension is present and the CA flag is set to TRUE.

### 5.3.5.2 FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

#### FIA\_X509\_EXT.2 X.509 Certificate Authentication

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.1**<sup>31</sup> The TSF shall use X.509v3 certificates as defined by RFC 5280 to support authentication for IPsec and [no additional uses].

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.2.2** When the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the TSF shall [allow the Administrator to choose whether to accept the certificate in these cases, not accept the certificate].

### 5.3.5.3 FIA\_X509\_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

#### FIA\_X509\_EXT.3 X.509 Certificate Requests

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall generate a Certificate Request as specified by RFC 2986 and be able to provide the following information in the request: public key and [device-specific information, Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country].

**FIA\_X509\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall validate the chain of certificates from the Root CA upon receiving the CA Certificate Response.

### 5.3.5.4 FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Keys

#### 5.3.5.5 FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1 Pre-Shared Keys<sup>32</sup>

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.1/VPN** The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec and [no other protocols].

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2/VPN** The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:

- are 22 characters and [1 to 255 characters];
- composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", and ")").

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [SHA-1, [conversion of the text string into an authentication value as per RFC 2409 for IKEv1 or RFC 4306 for IKEv2, using the pseudo-random function that is configured as the hash algorithm for the IKE exchanges]].

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall be able to [accept] bit-based pre-shared keys.

#### 5.3.3.1 FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1/MACsec Pre-shared Key Composition

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.1/MACsec** The TSF shall use pre-shared keys for MKA as defined by IEEE 802.1X, [no other protocols].

**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1.2/MACsec** The TSF shall be able to [accept, generate using the random bit generator specified in FCS RBG EXT.1] bit-based pre-shared keys.

<sup>31</sup> In accordance to [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>32</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

## 5.4 Security Management (FMT)

### 5.4.1 Management of functions in TSF (FMT\_MOF)

#### 5.4.1.1 FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour

##### FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate Management of security functions behaviour

**FMT\_MOF.1.1/ManualUpdate** The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the functions to perform manual updates to Security Administrators.

#### 5.4.1.2 FMT\_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour

##### FMT\_MOF.1/Services Management of security functions behaviour

**FMT\_MOF.1.1/Services** The TSF shall restrict the ability to **start and stop the functions services** to Security Administrators.

#### 5.4.1.3 FMT\_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour

##### FMT\_MOF.1/Functions Management of security functions behaviour

**FMT\_MOF.1.1/Functions** The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions [transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, handling of audit data] to Security Administrators.

### 5.4.2 Management of TSF Data (FMT\_MTD)

#### 5.4.2.1 FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data

##### FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData Management of TSF Data

**FMT\_MTD.1.1/CoreData** The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to Security Administrators.

#### 5.4.2.2 FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data

##### FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys Management of TSF data

**FMT\_MTD.1.1/CryptoKeys**<sup>33</sup> The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the [cryptographic keys and certificates used for VPN operations] to [Security Administrators].

### 5.4.3 Specification of Management Functions (FMT\_SMF)

#### 5.4.3.1 FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

##### FMT\_SMF.1/ND Specification of Management Functions for ND

**FMT\_SMF.1.1/ND**<sup>34</sup> The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;
- Ability to configure the access banner;
- Ability to configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking;
- Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using **digital signature and [no other]** capability prior to installing those updates;
- Ability to configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA\_AFL.1;
- [

<sup>33</sup> As per [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>34</sup> As per TD0631.

- Ability to manage cryptographic keys;
  - Ability to configure audit behaviour (e.g. change storage locations for audit; changes to behaviour when local audit storage space is full);
  - Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality;
  - Ability to configure the lifetime for IPsec SAs;
  - Ability to import X.509v3 certificates to the TOE's trust store;
  - Ability to configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
  - Ability to re-enable an Administrator account;
  - Ability to set the time which is used for time-stamps;
  - Ability to configure NTP;
  - Ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
  - Ability to manage the trusted public keys database].
  - Ability of a Security Administrator to<sup>35</sup>:
    - Generate a PSK-based CAK and install it in the device
    - Manage the Key Server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants [as specified in 802.1X, sections 9.13 and 9.16 (cf. MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaParticipantEntry) and section 12.2 (cf. function createMKA())]
    - Specify a lifetime of a CAK
    - Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using [the MIB object ieee8021XKayMkaPartActivateControl]
    - Configure the number of failed administrator authentication attempts that will cause an account to be locked out
    - Configure the time interval for administrator lockout due to excessive authentication failures,
    - [Configuring the MACsec confidentiality offset]
- ]

#### FMT\_SMF.1/VPN Specification of Management Functions (VPN Gateway)<sup>36</sup>

**FMT\_SMF.1.1/VPN** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- Definition of packet filtering rules;
- Association of packet filtering rules to network interfaces;
- Ordering of packet filtering rules by priority;
- [
- Configuration of attributes used to deny establishment of remote VPN client session;]

#### FMT\_SMF.1/IPS Specification of Management Functions for IPS<sup>37</sup>

**FMT\_SMF.1.1/IPS** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- Enable, disable signatures applied to sensor interfaces, and determine the behavior of IPS functionality
- Modify these parameters that define the network traffic to be collected and analyzed:
  - Source IP addresses (host address and network address)
  - Destination IP addresses (host address and network address)
  - Source port (TCP and UDP)
  - Destination port (TCP and UDP)
  - Protocol (IPv4 and IPv6)

<sup>35</sup> As per TD0652.

<sup>36</sup> As per [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>37</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_IPS].

- *ICMP type and code*
- *Update (import) signatures*
- *Create custom signatures*
- *Configure anomaly detection*
- *Enable and disable actions to be taken when signature or anomaly matches are detected*
- *Modify thresholds that trigger IPS reactions*
- *Modify the duration of traffic blocking actions*
- *Modify the known-good and known-bad lists (of IP addresses or address ranges)*
- *Configure the known-good and known-bad lists to override signature-based IPS policies]*

#### **FMT\_SMF.1/FFW Specification of Management Functions<sup>38</sup>**

**FMT\_SMF.1.1/FFW** The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:

- *Ability to configure firewall rules;*

### **5.4.4 Security management roles (FMT\_SMR)**

#### **5.4.4.1 FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on security roles**

#### **FMT\_SMR.2 Restrictions on Security Roles**

**FMT\_SMR.2.1** The TSF shall maintain the roles:

- *Security Administrator.*

**FMT\_SMR.2.2** The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

**FMT\_SMR.2.3** The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;*
- *The Security Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely*

are satisfied.

## **5.5 Protection of the TSF (FPT)**

### **5.5.1 Protection of TSF Data (Extended – FPT\_SKP\_EXT)**

#### **5.5.1.1 FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)**

#### **FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1 Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all pre-shared, symmetric and private keys)**

**FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys.

### **5.5.2 Protection of Administrator Passwords (Extended – FPT\_APW\_EXT)**

#### **5.5.2.1 FPT\_APW\_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords**

#### **FPT\_APW\_EXT.1 Protection of Administrator Passwords**

**FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall store administrative passwords in non-plaintext form.

**FPT\_APW\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext administrative passwords.

<sup>38</sup> As per [MOD\_CPP\_FW]

### 5.5.3 TSF testing (Extended - FPT\_TST\_EXT)

#### 5.5.3.1 FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF Testing (Extended)

##### FPT\_TST\_EXT.1 TSF testing

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [during initial start-up (on power on)] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [

- Noise source health tests,
- Power on test,
- File integrity test,
- Crypto integrity test,
- Authentication test,
- Algorithm known answer tests].

#### 5.5.3.2 FPT\_TST\_EXT.3 TSF Self-Test with Defined Methods

##### FPT\_TST\_EXT.3 TSF Testing<sup>39</sup>

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.3.1** The TSF shall run a suite of the following self-tests [[when loaded for execution]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF: [integrity verification of stored executable code].

**FPT\_TST\_EXT.3.2** The TSF shall execute the self-testing through [a TSF-provided cryptographic service specified in FCS\_COP.1/SigGen].

### 5.5.4 Trusted Update (FPT\_TUD\_EXT)

#### 5.5.4.1 FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Trusted Update

##### FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1 Trusted update

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall provide *Security Administrators* the ability to query the currently executing version of the TOE firmware/software and [no other TOE firmware/software version].

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall provide *Security Administrators* the ability to manually initiate updates to TOE firmware/software and [no other update mechanism].

**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1.3<sup>40</sup>** The TSF shall provide means to authenticate firmware/software updates to the TOE using a **digital signature mechanism and [no other mechanism]** prior to installing those updates.

### 5.5.5 Time stamps (Extended - FPT\_STM\_EXT)

#### 5.5.5.1 FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps

##### FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Stamps<sup>41</sup>

**FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

**FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall [allow the Security Administrator to set the time, , synchronise time with an NTP server].

<sup>39</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>40</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>41</sup> As per TD0632



## 5.5.6 Self-test Failures (FPT\_FLS)

### 5.5.6.1 FPT\_FLS.1/SelfTest Fail Secure

#### 5.5.6.1 FPT\_FLS.1/SelfTest Fail Secure <sup>42</sup>

**FPT\_FLS.1.1/SelfTest** The TSF shall **shut down** when the following types of failures occur: [failure of the power-on self-tests, failure of integrity check of the TSF executable image, failure of noise source health tests].

## 5.6 TOE Access (FTA)

### 5.6.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking (Extended - FTA\_SSL\_EXT)

#### 5.6.1.1 FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

##### FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1 TSF-initiated Session Locking

**FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a Security Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

### 5.6.2 Session locking and termination (FTA\_SSL)

#### 5.6.2.1 FTA\_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination (Refinement)

##### FTA\_SSL.3 TSF-initiated Termination

**FTA\_SSL.3.1:** The TSF shall terminate a **remote** interactive session after a *Security Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity*.

#### 5.6.2.2 FTA\_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination (Refinement)

##### FTA\_SSL.4 User-initiated Termination

**FTA\_SSL.4.1:** The TSF shall allow **Administrator**-initiated termination of the **Administrator's** own interactive session.

### 5.6.3 TOE access banners (FTA\_TAB)

#### 5.6.3.1 FTA\_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners (Refinement)

##### FTA\_TAB.1 Default TOE Access Banners

**FTA\_TAB.1.1:** Before establishing an **administrative user** session the TSF shall display a **Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent** warning message regarding use of the TOE.

## 5.7 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

### 5.7.1 Trusted Channel (FTP\_ITC)

#### 5.7.1.1 FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel (Refinement)

##### FTP\_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel

**FTP\_ITC.1.1** The TSF shall use [**IPsec, SSH, MACsec**<sup>43</sup>] to provide a trusted communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit server, [management station, MACsec peer entity, node configured in Cluster Mode]** that is logically

<sup>42</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>43</sup> In accordance with [MACSEC]

distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data **from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

**FTP\_ITC.1.2** The TSF shall permit **the TSF or the authorized IT entities** to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

**FTP\_ITC.1.3** The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [streaming of syslog events, communication between two hosts configured in Cluster Mode].

FTP\_ITC.1/VPN Inter-TSF trusted channel (VPN Communications)<sup>44</sup>

**FTP\_ITC.1.1/VPN** The TSF shall **be capable of using IPsec** to provide a communication channel between itself and **authorized IT entities supporting VPN communications** that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from **disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data**.

**FTP\_ITC.1.2/VPN** The TSF shall permit [the authorized IT entities] to initiate communication via the trusted channel.

**FTP\_ITC.1.3/VPN** The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [*remote VPN gateways/peers*].

## 5.7.2 Trusted Path (FTP\_TRP)

### 5.7.2.1 FTP\_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path (Refinement)

#### FTP\_TRP.1/Admin Trusted Path

**FTP\_TRP.1.1/Admin** The TSF shall **be capable of using [SSH, IPsec]** to provide a communication path between itself and **authorized remote Administrators** that is logically distinct from other communication paths and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated data from **disclosure and provides detection of modification of the channel data**.

**FTP\_TRP.1.2/Admin** The TSF shall permit remote Administrators to initiate communication via the trusted path.

**FTP\_TRP.1.3/Admin** The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial Administrator authentication and all remote administration actions.

## 5.8 User Data Protection (FDP)

### 5.8.1 Residual information protection (FDP\_RIP)

#### 5.8.1.1 FDP\_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection

#### FDP\_RIP.2 Full Residual Information Protection<sup>45</sup>

**FDP\_RIP.2.1** The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.

<sup>44</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>45</sup> As per [MOD\_CPP\_FW]

## 5.9 Packet Filtering (FPF)

### 5.9.1 Packet Filtering Rules (FPF\_RUL\_EXT)

#### 5.9.1.1 FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1 Rules for Packet Filtering

##### FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1 Rules for Packet Filtering<sup>46</sup>

**FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform Packet Filtering on network packets processed by the TOE.

**FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall allow the definition of Packet Filtering rules using the following network protocol fields:

- *IPv4 (RFC791)*
  - *Source address*
  - *Destination Address*
  - *Protocol*
- *IPv6 (RFC2460)*
  - *Source address*
  - *Destination Address*
  - *Next Header (Protocol)*
- *TCP (RFC793)*
  - *Source Port*
  - *Destination Port*
- *UDP (RFC768)*
  - *Source Port*
  - *Destination Port*

**FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with Packet Filtering rules: permit and drop with the capability to log the operation.

**FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall allow the Packet Filtering rules to be assigned to each distinct network interface.

**FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall process the applicable Packet Filtering rules (as determined in accordance with FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.4) in the following order: Administrator-defined.

**FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall drop traffic if a matching rule is not identified.

## 5.10 Firewall (FFW)

### 5.10.1 Stateful Traffic Filter Firewall (FFW\_RUL\_EXT)

#### 5.10.1.1 FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1 Stateful Traffic Filtering

##### FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1 Stateful Traffic Filtering<sup>47</sup>

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform stateful traffic filtering on network packets processed by the TOE.

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall allow the definition of Stateful Traffic Filtering rules using the following network protocol fields:

- *ICMPv4*
  - *Type*
  - *Code*

<sup>46</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_VPNGW]

<sup>47</sup> As per [MOD\_CPP\_FW]

- *ICMPv6*
  - *Type*
  - *Code*
- *IPv4*
  - *Source address*
  - *Destination Address*
  - *Transport Layer Protocol*
- *IPv6*
  - *Source address*
  - *Destination Address*
  - *Transport Layer Protocol*
  - *[no other field]*
- *TCP*
  - *Source Port*
  - *Destination Port*
- *UDP*
  - *Source Port*
  - *Destination Port*
- *and distinct interface.*

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with Stateful Traffic Filtering rules: permit or drop with the capability to log the operation.

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall allow the Stateful Traffic Filtering rules to be assigned to each distinct network interface.

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall

- a) *accept a network packet without further processing of Stateful Traffic Filtering rules if it matches an allowed established session for the following protocols: TCP, UDP, [ICMP] based on the following network packet attributes:*
  1. *TCP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, sequence number, Flags;*
  2. *UDP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports;*
  3. *[ICMP: source and destination addresses, type, [code]].*
- b) *Remove existing traffic flows from the set of established traffic flows based on the following: [session inactivity timeout, completion of the expected information flow].*

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall enforce the following default Stateful Traffic Filtering rules on all network traffic:

- a) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of [logging] packets which are invalid fragments;*
- b) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of [logging] fragmented packets which cannot be re-assembled completely;*
- c) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging packets where the source address of the network packet is defined as being on a broadcast network;*
- d) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging packets where the source address of the network packet is defined as being on a multicast network;*  
*The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source address of the network packet is defined as being a loopback address;*
- e) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is defined as being unspecified (i.e. 0.0.0.0) or an address “reserved for future use” (i.e. 240.0.0.0/4) as specified in RFC 5735 for IPv4;*

- f) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is defined as an “unspecified address” or an address “reserved for future definition and use” (i.e. unicast addresses not in this address range: 2000::/3) as specified in RFC 3513 for IPv6;*
- g) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets with the IP options: Loose Source Routing, Strict Source Routing, or Record Route specified; and*
- h) *[no other rules].*

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.7** The TSF shall be capable of dropping and logging according to the following rules:

- a) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source address of the network packet is equal to the address of the network interface where the network packet was received;*
- b) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source or destination address of the network packet is a link-local address;*
- c) *The TSF shall drop and be capable of logging network packets where the source address of the network packet does not belong to the networks associated with the network interface where the network packet was received.*

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.8** The TSF shall process the applicable Stateful Traffic Filtering rules in an administratively defined order.

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.9** The TSF shall deny packet flow if a matching rule is not identified.

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1.10** The TSF shall be capable of limiting an administratively defined number of half-open TCP connections. In the event that the configured limit is reached, new connection attempts shall be dropped and the drop event shall be [\[logged\]](#).

### 5.10.1.2 FFW\_RUL\_EXT.2 Stateful Filtering of Dynamic Protocols

#### FFW\_RUL\_EXT.2 Stateful Filtering of Dynamic Protocols<sup>48</sup>

**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.2.1** The TSF shall dynamically define rules or establish sessions allowing network traffic to flow for the following network protocols [\[FTP\]](#).

## 5.11 Intrusion Prevention (IPS)

### 5.11.1 Network Traffic Analysis (IPS\_NTA\_EXT)

#### 5.11.1.1 Network Traffic Analysis

#### IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1 Network Traffic Analysis<sup>49</sup>

**IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall perform analysis of IP-based network traffic forwarded to the TOE’s sensor interfaces, and detect violations of administratively-defined IPS policies.

**IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall process (be capable of inspecting) the following network traffic protocols:

- *Internet Protocol (IPv4), RFC 791*
- *Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), RFC 2460*
- *Internet control message protocol version 4 (ICMPv4), RFC 792*
- *Internet control message protocol version 6 (ICMPv6), RFC 2463*
- *Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), RFC 793*
- *User Data Protocol (UDP), RFC 768*

<sup>48</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_CPP\_FW].

<sup>49</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_IPS].

**IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall allow the signatures to be assigned to sensor interfaces configured for promiscuous mode, and to interfaces configured for inline mode, and support designation of one or more interfaces as ‘management’ for communication between the TOE and external entities without simultaneously being sensor interfaces.

- *Promiscuous (listen-only) mode: [none];*
- *Inline (data pass-through) mode: [Ethernet interfaces];*
- *Management mode: [Ethernet interfaces, out-of-band management Ethernet interfaces];*
- [
  - *Session-reset-capable interfaces: [Ethernet interfaces];*
  - *and no other interface types].*]

## 5.11.2 IPS IP Blocking (IPS\_IPB\_EXT)

### 5.11.2.1 IP Blocking

#### IPS\_[ IP Blocking]<sup>50</sup>

**IPS\_IPB\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall support configuration and implementation of known-good and known-bad lists of [source, destination] IP addresses and [no additional address types].

**IPS\_IPB\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall allow [*Security Administrators*] to configure the following IPS policy elements: [known-good list rules, known-bad list rules, IP addresses].

## 5.11.3 Signature-Based IPS Functionality (IPS\_SBD\_EXT)

### 5.11.3.1 Signature-Based IPS

#### IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1 Signature-Based IPS Functionality<sup>51</sup>

**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall support inspection of packet header contents and be able to inspect at least the following header fields:

- *IPv4: Version; Header Length; Packet Length; ID; IP Flags; Fragment Offset; Time to Live (TTL); Protocol; Header Checksum; Source Address; Destination Address; IP Options; and [no other field].*
- *IPv6: Version; payload length; next header; hop limit; source address; destination address; routing header; and [traffic class, flow label].*
- *ICMP: Type; Code; Header Checksum; and [rest of header (varies based on the ICMP type and code)].*
- *ICMPv6: Type; Code; and Header Checksum.*
- *TCP: Source port; destination port; sequence number; acknowledgement number; offset; reserved; TCP flags; window; checksum; urgent pointer; and TCP options.*
- *UDP: Source port; destination port; length; and UDP checksum.*

**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall support inspection of packet payload data and be able to inspect at least the following data elements to perform string-based pattern-matching:

- *ICMPv4 data: characters beyond the first 4 bytes of the ICMP header.*
- *ICMPv6 data: characters beyond the first 4 bytes of the ICMP header.*
- *TCP data (characters beyond the 20 byte TCP header), with support for detection of:
 
  - i) *FTP (file transfer) commands: help, noop, stat, syst, user, abort, acct, allo, appe, cdup, cwd, dele, list, mkd, mode, nlst, pass, pasv, port, pass, quit, rein, rest, retr, rmd, rnfr, rnto, site, smnt, stor, stou, stru, and type.**

<sup>50</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_IPS]

<sup>51</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_IPS]

- ii) *HTTP (web) commands and content: commands including GET and POST, and administrator-defined strings to match URLs/URIs, and web page content.*
- iii) *SMTP (email) states: start state, SMTP commands state, mail header state, mail body state, abort state.*
- iv) *[no other types of TCP payload inspection];*
- *UDP data: characters beyond the first 8 bytes of the UDP header;*
- *[no other types of packet payload inspection];*

In addition, the TSF shall support stream reassembly or equivalent to detect malicious payload even if it is split across multiple non-fragmented packets.

**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall be able to detect the following header-based signatures (using fields identified in IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.1) at IPS sensor interfaces:

- a) IP Attacks
  - i. IP Fragments Overlap (Teardrop attack, Bonk attack, or Boink attack)
  - ii. IP source address equal to the IP destination (Land attack)
- b) ICMP Attacks
  - i. Fragmented ICMP Traffic (e.g. Nuke attack)
  - ii. Large ICMP Traffic (Ping of Death attack)
- c) TCP Attacks
  - i. TCP NULL flags
  - ii. TCP SYN+FIN flags
  - iii. TCP FIN only flags
  - iv. TCP SYN+RST flags
- d) UDP Attacks
  - i. UDP Bomb Attack
  - ii. UDP Chargen DoS Attack

**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.4** The TSF shall be able to detect all the following traffic-pattern detection signatures, and to have these signatures applied to IPS sensor interfaces:

- a) Flooding a host (DoS attack)
  - i. ICMP flooding (Smurf attack, and ping flood)
  - ii. TCP flooding (e.g. SYN flood)
- b) Flooding a network (DoS attack)
- c) Protocol and port scanning
  - i. IP protocol scanning
  - ii. TCP port scanning
  - iii. UDP port scanning
  - iv. ICMP scanning

**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.5** The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with signature-based IPS policies:

- *In any mode, for any sensor interface: [*
  - *allow the traffic flow;*
  - *send a TCP reset to the source address of the offending traffic;*
  - *send a TCP reset to the destination address of the offending traffic]*
- *In inline mode:*
  - *block/drop the traffic flow;*
  - *and [allow all traffic flow]*

**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.6** The TSF shall support stream reassembly or equivalent to detect malicious payload even if it is split across multiple non-fragmented packets.

## 5.11.4 Anomaly-Based IPS Functionality (IPS\_ABD\_EXT)

### 5.11.4.1 IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1 Anomaly-Based IPS Functionality

#### IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1 Anomaly-Based IPS<sup>52</sup>

**IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1.1** The TSF shall support the definition of [anomaly ('unexpected') traffic patterns] including the specification of [

- *throughput ([bits per second]);*
- *time of day;*
- *frequency;*
- *thresholds;*
- *[no other methods]*

and the following network protocol fields:

- *[IPv4: source address; destination address*
- *IPv6: source address; destination address*
- *TCP: source port; destination port*
- *UDP: source port; destination port]*

**IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1.2** The TSF shall support the definition of anomaly activity through [manual configuration by administrators].

**IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1.3** The TSF shall allow the following operations to be associated with anomaly-based IPS policies:

- *In any mode, for any sensor interface: [*
  - *allow the traffic flow;*
  - *send a send a TCP reset to the source address of the offending traffic;*
  - *send a TCP reset to the destination address of the offending traffic]*
- *In inline mode:*
  - *allow the traffic flow*
  - *block/drop the traffic flow*
  - *and [no other actions].*

---

<sup>52</sup> In accordance with [MOD\_IPS]



## 6 Security Assurance Requirements

61. The TOE security assurance requirements are taken from [CPP\_ND] , together with the refinements documented in [CPP\_ND] Section 7, as listed in Table 6 below.

Assurance Class	Assurance Component
Security Target (ASE)	Conformance claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended components definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	ST introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Security objectives for the operational environment (ASE_OBJ.1)
	Stated security requirements (ASE_REQ.1)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV)	Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance documents (AGD)	Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
	Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
Life cycle support (ALC)	Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE)	Independent testing – conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1)

**Table 6 Security Assurance Requirements**

## 7 TOE Summary Specification

### 7.1 Protected communications

62. Local console access is gained by connecting an RJ-45 cable between the console port on the appliance and a workstation with a serial connection client.

#### 7.1.1 Algorithms and zeroization

63. All FIPS-approved cryptographic functions implemented by the secure network appliance are implemented in the following libraries:

- Junos OS 22.2R1 – Dataplane (for IPsec for customer ports)
- Junos OS 22.2R1 – Quicksec (for IKE Daemon for both customer ports and HA control link)
- Junos OS 22.2R1 - OpenSSL (for SSH and the PKI daemons, and DRBG for all daemons) in Control Plane
- Junos OS 22.2R1 - OpenSSH (for SSH Daemon)
- Junos OS 22.2R1 – LibMD (MGD daemon)
- Junos OS 22.2R1 - Kernel (for veriexec and IPsec for HA control link)
- Junos OS 22.2R1 – MACsec

64. In addition, for MACsec, the TOE uses the AES implementations in the Broadcom BCM54192 and BCM82756 chips.

65. All random number generation by the TOE is performed in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90 using HMAC\_DRBG implemented in the OpenSSL library (FCS\_RBG\_EXT.1.1). Additionally, SHA (256,512) is implemented in the LibMD library which is used for password hashing by Junos' MGD daemon.

66. The network appliance is to be operated with FIPS mode enabled.

67. Table 7 lists the cryptographic algorithms implemented by the TOE. It specifies the corresponding algorithm standards and supported configuration parameters

Crypto Module/ Library	FIPS PUB	Algorithm, Mode, Keysize, Function, Hashing, Usage	SRX380 Processor
Data plane – IPSec Daemon	FIPS 197, SP 800-38D	AES-GCM (128, 192, 256) (Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) w/ internal accelerators (HW/FW)
	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A	AES-CBC (128, 192, 256) (Encrypt, Decrypt)	
	FIPS 180-4	SHS: SHA (1, 256) Byte Oriented (Message Digest Generation)	
	FIPS 198-1	HMAC-SHA (1, 256), Byte Oriented (Message Authentication)	

Crypto Module/ Library	FIPS PUB	Algorithm, Mode, Keysize, Function, Hashing, Usage	SRX380 Processor
Quicksec – IKED Daemon	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A	AES-CBC (128, 192, 256) (Encrypt, Decrypt)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) (FW)
	FIPS 197, SP 800-38D	AES-GCM (128, 256) (Encrypt, Decrypt, AEAD)	
	FIPS 180-4	SHS: SHA (256, 384) Byte Oriented (Message Digest Generation)	
	FIPS 198-1	HMAC-SHA (256, 384)	
	SP 800-135	IKE v1/v2 KDF (SHA-256, SHA-384)	
Quicksec – All Daemons	SP 800-90A	DRBG (HMAC-SHA-256) (Random Bit Generation)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) (FW)
Octeon – IKED Daemon	FIPS 186-4	RSA PKCS1_V1_5 (n=2048 (SHA 256), n=4096 (SHA 256)) (SigGen, SigVer)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) w/ internal accelerators (HW/FW) - Partly accelerated
	FIPS 186-4	ECDSA (P-256 w/ SHA- 256) ECDSA (P-384 w/ SHA- 384) (SigGen, SigVer, KeyGen for ECDH)	
Octeon – IKED Daemon	SP 800-56A Rev. 3	KAS-SSC (DH Groups 14 and 24)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) w/ internal accelerators (HW/FW) – Partly accelerated
Octeon – IKED Daemon	SP 800-56A Rev. 3	KAS-SSC (ECDH Groups 19 and 20);	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) w/ internal accelerators (HW/FW) - Partly accelerated
OpenSSL – SSHD Daemon and PKID Daemon	FIPS 197, SP800-38A	AES-CBC/CTR (128, 192, 256) (Encrypt, Decrypt)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) (FW)
	FIPS 180-4	SHS: SHA (1, 256, 384, 512) Byte Oriented (Message Digest Generation, KDF Primitive)	

Crypto Module/ Library	FIPS PUB	Algorithm, Mode, Keysize, Function, Hashing, Usage	SRX380 Processor
	FIPS 198-1	HMAC-SHA (1, 256, 512) Byte Oriented (Message Authentication DRBG Primitive)	
	FIPS 186-4	RSA PKCS1_V1_5 (n=2048 (SHA-256), n=4096 (SHA-256)) (SigGen, SigVer)	
	FIPS 186-4	RSA X931 (n=2048 (SHA-256), n=4096 (SHA-256)) (KeyGen)	
	FIPS 186-4	ECDSA [P-256 (SHA- 256)], [P-384 (SHA- 384)], [P-521 (SHA-512)] (SigGen, SigVer, KeyGen)	
	SP 800-56 A Rev. 3	KAS-SSC (Group 14, 19, 20, 21)	
OpenSSL – All Daemons	SP 800-90A	DRBG (HMAC-SHA-2- 256) (Random Bit Generation)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) (FW)
OpenSSH – SSHD Daemon	SP 800-135	SSH v2 KDF (SHA 1, SHA- 256, SHA-384) (Key Derivation)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) (FW)
Libmd - MGD Daemon, Password Hashing	FIPS 180-4	SHS: SHA (1, 256) Byte Oriented (Message Digest Generation)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) (FW)
	FIPS 198-1	HMAC-SHA (256) Byte Oriented Message Digest Generation)	
Kernel – Veriexec, kernel DRBG, IPsec for HA control link	SP800-90A	DRBG (HMAC-SHA-2- 256) (Random Bit Generation)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) (FW)
	FIPS 198-1	HMAC-SHA (1, 256) Byte Oriented (Message Authentication, DRBG Primitive)	

Crypto Module/ Library	FIPS PUB	Algorithm, Mode, Keysize, Function, Hashing, Usage	SRX380 Processor
	FIPS 180-4	SHS: SHA (1, 256) Byte Oriented (Message Digest Generation)	
	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A	AES-CBC (128, 192, 256) (Encrypt, Decrypt)	
MACsec – MACsec Daemon	FIPS 197, SP 800-38A	AES-CBC (128, 256) (Encrypt, Decrypt)	Cavium Octeon III (CN7360) (FW)
	FIPS 197, SP 800-38D	AES-CMAC (128, 256) (Encrypt, Decrypt)	
	SP800-35F	AES-KW (128)	
	SP800-108	Counter CMAC AES (128,256)	
Broadcom BCM54192	SP800-38D	AES-GCM (128, 256)	N/A
Broadcom BCM82756	SP800-38D	AES-GCM (128, 256)	N/A

Table 7 Cryptographic Services

68. Asymmetric keys are generated in accordance with NIST SP 800-56A and FIPS PUB 186-4 for IKE with IPsec. The TOE complies with section 5.6 of NIST SP 800-56A regarding asymmetric key pair generation. The TOE implements all of the "shall" and "should" requirements and none of the "shall not" or "should not" from FIPS PUB 186-4 Appendix B3 and B4. (**FCS\_CKM.1/IKE**)
69. Asymmetric keys are also generated in accordance with FIPS PUB 186-4 Appendix B.3 for RSA Schemes and Appendix B.4 for ECC Schemes for SSH communications. The TOE implements Diffie-Hellman group 14, using the modulus and generator specified by Section 3 of RFC3526. (**FCS\_CKM.2, FCS\_CKM.1/ND**).
70. The following table relates cryptographic algorithms to the protocols by the TOE. The TOE acts as both sender and recipient for IPsec and only as the server for SSH in the supported protocols listed in Table 8.

Protocol	Key Exchange	Auth	Cipher	Integrity
IKEv1	Group 14 (modp 2048)	RSA 2048,	AES CBC 128	SHA-256
	Group 19 (P-256)	RSA 4096	AES CBC 192	SHA-384
	Group 20 (P-384)	ECDSA P-256	AES CBC 256	SHA-512
	Group 24 (modp 2048)	ECDSA P-384	AES GCM 128	
		Pre-Shared Key	AES GCM 256	
IKEv2	Group 14 (modp 2048)	RSA 2048,	AES CBC 128	HMAC-SHA-256
	Group 15 (mod 3072)	RSA 4096	AES CBC 192	HMAC-SHA-384
	Group 16 (mod 4096)	ECDSA P-256	AES CBC 256	HMAC-SHA-512
	Group 19 (P-256)	ECDSA P-384	AES GCM 128	
	Group 20 (P-384)	Pre-Shared Key	AES GCM 256	
	Group 24 (modp 2048)			
IPsec ESP	IKEv1 with optional:	IKEv1	AES CBC 128	HMAC-SHA-256-128
	Group 14 (modp 2048)		AES CBC 192	
	Group 19 (P-256)		AES CBC 256	
	Group 20 (P-384)		AES GCM 128	

	Group 24 (modp 2048)		AES GCM 192 AES GCM 256	
	IKEv2 with optional: Group 14 (modp 2048) Group 19 (P-256) Group 20 (P-384) Group 24 (modp 2048)	IKEv2	AES CBC 128 AES CBC 192 AES CBC 256 AES GCM 128 AES GCM 192 AES GCM 256	HMAC-SHA-256-128
SSHv2	DH Group 14 (modp 2048) ECDH-sha2-nistp256 ECDH-sha2-nistp384 ECDH-sha2-nistp521	ECDSA P-256 ECDSA P-384 ECDSA P-521 ssh_rsa	AES CTR 128 AES CTR 256 AES CBC 128 AES CBC 256	HMAC-SHA-1 HMAC-SHA-256 HMAC-SHA-512
MKA	MACsec Key Agreement	Shared secret	AES KW 128/256	CMAC-128
MACsec	MKA	MKA	AES GCM 128/256	

Table 8 Supported Protocols.

71. The integrity algorithm HMAC-SHA-1 uses key length 160 bits, message size of 128 bits and output size 96 bits. HMAC-SHA-256 uses key length 256 bits, message size of 128 bits and output size 128 bits. HMAC-SHA-384 uses key length 384 bits, message size 128 bits and output size 192 bits.
72. The TOE acts as both sender and recipient for IPsec and only as the server for SSH in the supported protocols listed in Table 8. The TOE implements Diffie-Hellman group 14, using the modulus and generator specified by Section 3 of RFC3526. (**FCS\_CKM.2**)
73. Zeroization of the critical security parameters is handled as stated in Table 9 (**FCS\_CKM.4**).

CSP	Description	Method of storage	Storage location	Zeroization Method
<b>SSH Private Host Key</b>	The first time SSH is configured, the set of Host keys is generated. Used to identify the host. ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 (ECDSA P-256) and/or ssh-rsa (RSA 2048)	Plaintext	File format on SDD)	When the appliance is recommissioned, the config files (including CSP files such as SSH keys) are removed using the “request system zeroize” option.
	Loaded into memory to complete session establishment	Plaintext	Memory	Memory free() operation is performed by Junos upon session termination
<b>SSH Session Key</b>	Session keys used with SSH, AES 128, 256, hmac-sha-1 or hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, DH Private Key (2048 or elliptic curve 256/384/521-bits)	Plaintext	Memory	Memory free() operation is performed by Junos upon session termination
<b>User Password</b>	Plaintext value as entered by user	Plaintext as entered	Processed in Memory	Memory free() operation is performed by Junos upon completion of authentication

CSP	Description	Method of storage	Storage location	Zeroization Method
		Hashed when stored (HMAC-sha1, sha256, sha512)	Stored on disk	When the appliance is recommissioned, the config files (including the obfuscated password) are removed using the "request system zeroize" option.
<b>RNG State</b>	Internal state and seed key of RNG	Plaintext	Memory	Handled by kernel, overwritten with zero's at reboot.
<b>IKE Private Host key</b>	Private authentication key used in IKE. RSA 2048, RSA 4096, ECDSA P-256, ECDSA P-384	Plaintext	Disk/Memory	'clear security ike security-association' command ('clear security IKE security-association ha-link-encryption' for the HA control link tunnel) or reboot the box. Private keys stored in flash are not zeroized unless an explicit "request system zeroize" is executed.
<b>IKE-SKEYID</b>	IKE master secret used to derive IKE and IPsec ESP session keys	Plaintext	Memory	'clear security ike security-association' command ('clear security IKE security-association ha-link-encryption' for the HA control link tunnel) or reboot the box.
<b>IKE Session Keys</b>	IKE session key. AES, HMAC	Plaintext	Memory	'clear security ike security-association' command ('clear security IKE security-association ha-link-encryption' for the HA control link tunnel) or reboot the box.
<b>ESP Session Key</b>	ESP session keys. AES, HMAC	Plaintext	Memory	'clear security ipsec security-association' command ('clear security IKE security-association ha-link-encryption' for the HA control link tunnel) or reboot the box.
<b>IKE-DH Private Exponent</b>	Ephemeral DH private exponent used in IKE. DH N = 224, 256 bit, ECDH P-256, or ECDH P-384.	Plaintext	Memory	'clear security IKE security-association' command ('clear security IKE security-association ha-link-encryption' for the HA control link tunnel) or reboot the box.

CSP	Description	Method of storage	Storage location	Zeroization Method
<b>IKE-PSK</b>	Pre-shared authentication key used in IKE.	Encrypted	Disk/Memory	'clear security IKE security-association' command ('clear security IKE security-association ha-link-encryption' for the HA control link tunnel) or reboot the box. Key values stored in flash are not zeroized unless an explicit "request system zeroize" is executed.
<b>ECDH private keys</b>	Loaded into memory to complete key exchange in session establishment	Plaintext	Memory	Memory free() operation is performed by Junos upon session termination
<b>MACsec CAK</b>	Pre-shared, static Connectivity Association Key	Encrypted using AES using System Master Password	Stored in config file	Actively zeroized using "request vmhost zeroize no-forwarding"
<b>MACsec SAK</b>	Security Association Key	Plaintext	Memory	Memory free() operation is performed by Junos upon session termination
<b>MACsec KEK</b>	Key Encryption Key	Plaintext	Memory	Memory free() operation is performed by Junos upon session termination
<b>MACsec ICK</b>	Integrity Check Key	Plaintext	Memory	Memory free() operation is performed by Junos upon session termination

Table 9 CSP Storage and Zeroization

74. Junos OS does not provide a CLI interface to permit the viewing of keys. Cryptographic keys are protected through the enforcement of kernel-level file access rights, limiting access to the contents of cryptographic key containers to processes with cryptographic rights or shell users with root permission<sup>53</sup>. Encrypted or obfuscated passwords can be viewed by Security Administrators using the CLI command 'request system decrypt password'. (*FPT\_SKP\_EXT.1*)

### 7.1.2 Random Bit Generation

75. Junos OS performs random bit generation in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-90 using HMAC\_DRBG, SHA-256. The RBG is seeded from both software and hardware sources. The entropy of the seed is at least 256 bits, which is higher than the security strength of any of the cryptographic keys generated by the TOE.

### 7.1.3 SSH

76. Junos OS supports and enforces Trusted Channels that protect the communications between the TOE and a remote audit server from unauthorized disclosure or modification. It also supports Trusted Paths between itself and remote administrators so that the contents of administrative

<sup>53</sup> Security Administrators do not have root permission in shell.



sessions are protected against unauthorized disclosure or modification. (***FTP\_ITC.1, FTP\_TRP.1/Admin***)

77. Junos OS provides an SSH server to support Trusted Channels using SSHv2 protocol which ensures the confidentiality and integrity of communication with the remote audit server. Export of audit information to a secure, remote server is achieved by setting up an event trace monitor that sends event log messages by using NETCONF over SSH to the remote system event logging server. The remote audit server initiates the connection. The SSHv2 protocol ensures that the data transmitted over a SSH session cannot be disclosed or altered by using the encryption and integrity mechanisms of the protocol with the FIPS cryptographic module. (***FTP\_ITC.1, FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1***)
78. The Junos OS SSH Server also supports Trusted Paths using SSHv2 protocol which ensures the confidentiality and integrity of user sessions. The encrypted communication path between Junos OS SSH Server and a remote administrator is provided by the use of an SSH session. Remote administrators of Junos OS initiate communication to the Junos CLI through the SSH tunnel created by the SSH session. Assured identification of Junos OS is guaranteed by using public key based authentication for SSH. The SSHv2 protocol ensures that the data transmitted over a SSH session cannot be disclosed or altered by using the encryption and integrity mechanisms of the protocol with the FIPS cryptographic module. If desired, an additional layer of protection can be afforded to the trusted path by using IPSec to encapsulate the SSH connection. (***FTP\_TRP.1/Admin, FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1***)
79. The Junos OS SSH server is implemented in accordance with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253, 4254, 5656 and 6668. Junos OS provides assured identification of the Junos OS appliance though public key authentication and supports password-based authentication by administrative users (Security Administrator) for SSH connections. The following table identifies conformance to the SSH related RFCs:

RFC	Summary	TOE implementation of Security
RFC 4251	The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture	<p><b>Host Keys:</b> The TOE uses an ECDSA Host Key for SSH v2, with a key size of 256 bits or greater, which is generated on initial setup of the TOE. It can be de-configured via the CLI and the key will be deleted and thus unavailable during connection establishment. This key is randomly generated to be unique to each TOE instance. The TOE presents the client with its public key and the client matches this key against its known_hosts list of keys. When a client connects to the TOE, the client will be able to determine if the same host key was used in previous connections, or if the key is different (per the SSHv2 protocol). Junos OS also supports RSA-based key establishment schemes with a key size of 2048 bits.</p> <p><b>Policy Issues:</b> The TOE implements all mandatory algorithms and methods. The TOE can be configured to accept public-key based authentication and/or password-based authentication. The TOE does not require multiple authentication mechanisms for users. The TOE allows port forwarding and sessions to clients. The TOE has no X11 libraries or applications and X11 forwarding is prohibited.</p> <p><b>Confidentiality:</b> The TOE does not accept the “none” cipher. It supports AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, AES-CTR-128, AES-CTR-256 encryption algorithms for protection of data over SSH and uses keys generated in accordance with “ssh-rsa”, “ecdsa-sha2-nistp256”, “ecdsa-sha2-nistp384” or “ecdsa-sha2-nistp521” to perform public-key based device authentication. For ciphers whose blocksize <math>\geq 16</math>, the TOE rekeys every <math>(2^{32}-1)</math> bytes. The client may explicitly request a rekeying event as a valid SSHv2 message at any time and the TOE will honor this request. Re-keying of SSH session keys can be configured using the sshd_config knob. The data-limit must be between 51200 and 4294967295 <math>(2^{32}-1)</math> bytes and the time-limit must be between 1 and 1440 minutes. In the evaluated deployment the time-limit must be set within 1 and 60 minutes.</p> <p><b>Denial of Service:</b> When the SSH connection is brought down, the TOE does not attempt to re-establish it.</p> <p><b>Ordering of Key Exchange Methods:</b> Key exchange is performed only using one of the supported key exchange algorithms, which are ordered as follows: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384, ecdh-sha2-nistp521 (all specified in RFC 5656), diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 (specified in RFC 4253).</p> <p><b>Debug Messages:</b> The TOE sshd server does not support debug messages via the CLI.</p> <p><b>End Point Security:</b> The TOE permits port forwarding.</p> <p><b>Proxy Forwarding:</b> The TOE permits proxy forwarding.</p> <p><b>X11 Forwarding:</b> The TOE does not support X11 forwarding.</p>

RFC	Summary	TOE implementation of Security
RFC 4252	The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol	<p><b>Authentication Protocol:</b> The TOE does not accept the “none” authentication method. The TOE implements a timeout period of 30seconds for authentication of the SSHv2 protocol and provides a limit of three failed authentication attempts before sending a disconnect to the client.</p> <p><b>Authentication Requests:</b> The TOE does not accept authentication if the requested service does not exist. The TOE does not allow authentication requests for a non-existent username to succeed – it sends back a disconnect message as it would for failed authentications and hence does not allow enumeration of valid usernames. The TOE denies “none” authentication method and replies with a list of permitted authentication methods.</p> <p><b>Public Key Authentication Method:</b> The TOE supports public key authentication for SSHv2 session authentication. The SSH client authenticates the identity of the SSH server using a local database associating each host name with its corresponding public key. Authentication succeeds if the correct private key is used. The TOE does not require multiple authentications (public key and password) for users.</p> <p><b>Password Authentication Method:</b> The TOE supports password authentication. Expired passwords are not supported and cannot be used for authentication.</p> <p><b>Host-Based Authentication:</b> The TOE does not support the configuration of host-based authentication methods.</p>
RFC 4253	The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol	<p><b>Encryption:</b> The TOE offers the following for encryption of SSH sessions: aes128-cbc and aes256-cbc, aes128-ctr, aes256-ctr. The TOE permits negotiation of encryption algorithms in each direction. The TOE does not allow the “none” algorithm for encryption.</p> <p><b>Maximum Packet length:</b> Packets greater than 256Kbytes in an SSH transport connection are dropped and the connection is terminated by Junos OS.</p> <p><b>Data Integrity:</b> The TOE permits negotiation of HMAC-SHA1 in each direction for SSH transport.</p> <p><b>Key Exchange:</b> The TOE supports diffie-hellman-group14-sha1.</p> <p><b>Key Re-Exchange:</b> The TOE performs a re-exchange when SSH_MSG_KEXINIT is received.</p>

RFC	Summary	TOE implementation of Security
RFC 4254	Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol	<p><b>Multiple channels:</b> The TOE assigns each channel a number (as detailed in RFC 4251, see above).</p> <p><b>Data transfers:</b> The TOE supports a maximum window size of 256K bytes for data transfer.</p> <p><b>Interactive sessions:</b> The TOE only supports interactive sessions that do NOT involve X11 forwarding.</p> <p><b>Forwarded X11 connections:</b> This is not supported in the TOE.</p> <p><b>Environment variable passing:</b> The TOE only sets variables once the server process has dropped privileges.</p> <p><b>Starting shells/commands:</b> The TOE supports starting one of shell, application program or command (only one request per channel). These will be run in the context of a channel, and will not halt the execution of the protocol stack.</p> <p><b>Window dimension change notices:</b> The TOE will accept notifications of changes to the terminal size (dimensions) from the client.</p> <p><b>Port forwarding:</b> This is fully supported by the TOE.</p>
RFC5656	SSH ECC Algorithm Integration	<p><b>ECDH Key Exchange:</b> The support key exchange methods specified in this RFC are ecdh-sha2-nistp256 or ecdh-sha2-nistp384 and ecdh-sha2-nistp521. The client matches the key against its known_hosts list of keys.</p> <p><b>Hashing:</b> Junos OS supports cryptographic hashing via the SHA-256 algorithm, provided it has a message digest size of 256 bits.</p> <p><b>Required Curves:</b> All required curves are implemented: ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-sha2-nistp384 and ecdh-sha2-nistp521. None of the Recommended Curves are supported as they are not included in [CPP_ND].</p>
RFC 6668	sha2-Transport Layer Protocol	<p><b>Data Integrity Algorithms:</b> Both the recommended and optional algorithm hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512 are implemented for SSH transport.</p>

Table 10 SSH RFC conformance

80. Certificates are stored in non-volatile flash memory. Access to flash memory requires administrator credentials. A certificate may be loaded via command line (FIA\_X.509\_EXT.1).

#### 7.1.4 IPsec

81. The TOE is conformant to RFC 4301 (**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.1**) and supports IPsec in tunnel mode and transport mode (**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.3**). IPsec is used for VPN communications between the TOE and IPsec peers in tunnel mode (**FCS\_ITC.1/VPN**), to protect audit log data between the TOE and the audit server, and to protect critical security parameter data exchanged between two instances of the TOE configured in Cluster Mode via the HA control link in transport mode (**FTP\_ITC.1**). IPsec can also be used for tunnelling the SSH traffic in the establishment of a trusted path for authenticating the Administrator of the TOE (**FTP\_TRP.1/Admin**). There is a single IKE daemon, which is used to negotiate all IPsec tunnels; however there are two implementations of IPsec: one for customer VPN communications implemented in the data plane, and one for the HA control link tunnel implemented in the control plane kernel.
82. By default, the TOE denies all traffic through an SRX Series device. An implicit default security policy exists that denies all packets. You can change this behavior by configuring a standard security policy that permits certain types of traffic. The implicit default policy can be changed to

permit all traffic with the `'set security policies default-policy'` command; however, this is not recommended.

83. The security policy rule set is an ordered list of security policy entries enforced by the firewall rules, each of which contains the specification of a network flow and an action:
  - Source IP address and network mask
  - Destination IP address and network mask
  - Protocol
  - Source port
  - Destination port
  - Action: permit, deny, drop silently, log
84. Each packet is compared against entries in the security policy ruleset in sequential order until one is found that matches the specification in the policy, or until the end of the rule set is reached, in which case the implicit default policy is implemented, and the packet is discarded. In the case of the IPsec for the HA control link, the security policy rule is not configurable. The TOE does not route any traffic through a HA control link. The only data sent through the HA control link IPsec tunnel is critical security parameter data between the TOE to the other Cluster node. critical security parameter data consists of the following:
  - contents of the configuration file
  - rcp and rsh data between the nodes
  - IPsec security association data for established VPN customer tunnels
85. (FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.2, supported by FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.1, FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.3, FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.4, FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.6, FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1.7)
86. The TOE supports AES-GCM-128, AES-GCM-192 and AES-GCM-256, and AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-192 or AES-CBC-256 using HMAC SHA-256 for ESP protection. For the HA control link tunnel, the TOE restricts its support of encryption algorithm to AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-192 or AES-CBC-256. **(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.4)**
87. IKEv1 and IKEv2 are implemented. IKEv1 as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, RFC 4109 and RFC 4868 for hash functions; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 (with no support for NAT traversal) and RFC 4868 for hash functions. IKEv1 aggressive mode is not supported. The HA control link tunnel only uses IKEv2. **(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.5)**
88. The TOE supports AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-192, AES-CBC-256, AES-GCM-128 and AES-GCM-256 for payload protection in IKEv1 and IKEv2. **(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.6)**
89. In the evaluated configuration, the TOE permits configuration of the IPsec lifetime exchanges for customer VPN tunnels in terms of number of (kilo)bytes (64 to 4294967294 kilo bytes) or length of time (180 seconds to 8 hours). For IKE, the TOE permits configuration of the lifetime exchanges in terms of length of time (180 seconds to 24 hours). The TOE does not allow users to configure the IPsec lifetime-kilobytes of the HA control link tunnel. **(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.7, FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.8)**
90. The following CLI commands configure a lifetime of either kilobytes or seconds:  
**(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.7, FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.8)**
  - set security ipsec proposal <name> lifetime-kilobytes <kb>
  - set security ipsec proposal <name> lifetime-seconds <seconds>

set security ike proposal <name> lifetime-seconds <seconds>

91. The TOE supports Diffie-Hellman Groups 14, 19, 20 and 24. In the IKEv1 phase 1 and phase 2 exchanges, the TOE and peer will agree on the best DH group both can support. When the TOE receives an IKE proposal, it will select the first DH group that matches the acceptable DH groups configured in the TOE (one or more of DH Groups 14, 19, 20 or 24) and the negotiation will fail if there is no match. Similarly, when the peer initiates the IKE protocol, the TOE will select the first match from the IKE proposal sent by the peer and the negotiation fails if no acceptable match is found. **(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.11)**
92. The TOE uses HMAC DRBG with SHA-256 for the generation of DH exponents and nonces in the IKE key exchange protocol of length 224 bits (for DH Group 14), 256 bits (for DH Groups 19 and 24) and 384 bits (for DH Group 20). **(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.9, FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.10)**
93. The TOE supports both RSA and ECDSA for use with X.509v3 certificates that conform to RFC 4945 and pre-shared Keys for IPsec support. **(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.13)**
94. The TOE ensures that the strength of the symmetric algorithm (128, 192 or 256 bits) negotiated to protect the IKEv1 Phase 1, IKEv2 IKE\_SA connection is greater than or equal to the strength of the symmetric algorithm negotiated to protect the IKEv1 Phase 2, IKEv2 CHILD\_SA connection. **(FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1.12)**
95. The TOE uses pre-shared keys for IPSec. The TOE accepts ASCII pre-shared or bit-based keys of 1 to 255 characters (and their binary equivalent) that may contain upper and lower case letters, numbers, and special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “\$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “\*”, “(”, and “)”). The TOE accepts pre-shared text keys and converts the text string into an authentication value as per RFC 2409 for IKEv1 or RFC 4306 for IKEv2, using the PRF that is configured as the hash algorithm for the IKE exchanges. **(FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1)**
96. The TOE uses X.509 certificates as defined in RFC 5280.
97. To generate a Certificate Request, the administrator uses the CLI command
 

```
request security pki generate-certificate-request
```
98. and supplies the following values:
  - Certificate-id – The internal identifier string for this certificate
  - Domain-name
  - Email address
  - IP address
  - Subject (DC=<Domain component>,CN=<Common-Name>,OU=<Organizational-Unit-name>,O=<Organization-name>,SN=<Serial-Number>,L=<Locality>,ST=<state>,C=<Country>)
  - Filename – The local file in which to store the certificate signing request
99. For the HA link, the syntax to generate a certificate request is
 

```
request security pki node-local generate-certificate-request
```

**(FIA\_X509\_EXT.3)**
100. To validate certificates, the TOE extracts the subject, issuer, subjects public key, signature, basicConstraints and validity period fields. If any of those fields is not present, the validation fails. The issuer is looked up in the PKI database. If the issuer is not present, or if the issuer certificate does not have the CA:true flag in the basicConstraints section, the validation fails. The TOE verifies the validity of the signature. If the signature is not valid, the validation fails. It then confirms that the current date and time is within the valid time period specified in the

certificate. The TOE also extracts the extendedKeyUsage field and verifies the value represents that for the Code Signing purpose (id-kp 3 with OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.3).

101. If the TOE is configured to perform a revocation check using CRL (as specified in RFC 5280 Section 6.3) and the CRL fails to download, there are two possible outcomes: If the TOE is configured with the option to skip CRL checking on download failure enabled, then the certificate shall be considered as having passed the validation. If the TOE is configured with the option to skip CRL checking on download failure disabled, then the certificate is considered to have failed validation.
102. The TOE validates a certificate path by building a chain of (at least 3) certificates based upon issuer and subject linkage, validating each according the certificate validation procedure described above. If any certificate in the chain fails validation, the validation fails as a whole. A self-signed certificate is not required to be at the root of the certificate chain.
103. The TOE determines if a certificate is a CA certificate by requiring the CA:true flag to be present in the basicConstraints section. (*FIA\_X509\_EXT.1.1/Rev*)
104. The TOE requires that the configured IKE identity of the local and remote endpoints to match the contents of the certificate associated with a SA endpoint. The TOE permits the identity to be expressed as distinguished name, fully qualified domain name (FQDN), user FQDN or IP address. If either certificate does not validate, or the contents do not match the configured identity, then the SA will not be established.
105. The PKI daemon on an SRX Series device validates all X509 certificates received from VPN peers during the IKE negotiation. If the TSF cannot establish a connection to determine the validity of a certificate, the SA will not be established unless the administrator of the TOE has explicitly configured the TOE to disable the CRL check in case the connection can not be established. (*FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2, FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1, FIA\_X509\_EXT.3*)
106. For public key-based authentication of IPsec connections, Junos OS validates the X.509 certificates by extracting the subject, issuer, signature, basicConstraints and validity period fields. If any of those fields is not present, the validation fails. The issuer is looked up in the PKI database. If the issuer CA is not present, or if the issuer certificate does not have the CA:true flag in the basicConstraints section, the validation fails. Junos OS verifies the validity of the signature. If the signature is not valid, the validation fails. It then confirms that the current date and time is within the valid time period specified in the certificate. (*FIA\_X509\_EXT.1/Rev, FIA\_X509\_EXT.2*)
107. Junos OS generates Certificate Request Messages as specified in RFC 2986 when validating certificates for IPsec connections. Device-specific information, Common Name, Organization, Organizational Unit, Country and public key details are provided in the CSR. Junos OS validates the chain of certificates from the Root CA when the CA Certificate Response is received. (*FIA\_X509\_EXT.3*).

### 7.1.5 NTP

108. Junos OS supports NTPv3 and NTPv4, authenticating the NTP server that it synchronizes to using a SHA1 or SHA2 message digest algorithms. The TOE ignores NTP timestamps that are broadcasted/multicast. The TOE multiple NTP servers to be configured. At least one is required for time synchronization to occur, but more than 3 NTP servers can be specified.

## 7.2 MACsec

109. MACsec is implemented in accordance with IEEE 802.1AE-2006 (*FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1*), supporting:
  - AES 128/256 ciphersuite (without XPN)

- MACsec Key Agreement (MKA) protocol with Static-CAK mode using pre-shared key
  - Connectivity-Association (CA) per physical port (IFD)
  - 1 Tx-Secure Channel and 1 Rx- Secure Channel per CA
  - 4 Secure Associations (SA) per SC
110. The TOE accepts pre-shared CAKs for MACsec key agreement protocols as defined by IEEE 802.1X. The TSF accepts bit-based preshared keys entered as a string of up to 64 hexadecimal characters. (**FIA\_PSK\_EXT.1**).
111. A Certificate chain of (pre-shared) CAKs is used to ensure session continuity while enforcing CAK lifetime. The lifetime of each CAK<sup>54</sup> is bounded by start time of next CAK, so a CAK will be expired when the start time for the next CAK is reached. To prevent unbounded lifetime for final CAK in chain the Authorized Administrator must ensure the CAK certificate chain is kept refreshed. The certificate chain length can contain a maximum of 64 keys, so if each CAK is configured with a start time 24 hours after the previous, the certificate chain needs to be refreshed once every 60 days to ensure continuity of service (with a few days buffer). The CAK certificate chain can with be imported as a file or enter through the CLI. (**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4**)
112. The CAK Certificate Chain is stored AES-encrypted in a configuration using the System Master Password. (**FPT\_CAK\_EXT.1**)
113. The Line Card can be programed to bypass certain ethertypes. In the evaluated configuration only Extended Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL - PAE EtherType 88-8E) and MACsec frames (EtherType 88-E5) are programmed to be bypassed. This means that only EAPOL and MACsec Ethernet frames will be accepted by the TOE; all other frames will be rejected. Also, a filter in PFE traps the packets to RE with ether type 88-8E. (**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1**)
114. Secure channel is identified by Secure Channel Identifier (SCI) that is comprised of a globally unique MAC address and a Port Identifier, unique within the system that has been allocated that address. SCI (8 octets) is appended to every MKPDU packet and the TOE can be configured to enforce SCI tagging such that packets are rejected if they do not have a valid SCI.. (**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.1**)
115. Each MACsec Key Agreement protocol data unit (MKPDU) transmitted is integrity protected by an 128 bit Integrity Check value (ICV), generated by AES- CMAC using the Integrity Check value Key (ICK). The ICV Key (ICK) is derived from CAK (using AES\_CMAC). Before verifying the ICV, the TOE follows Section 11.11.4 of IEEE 802.1X to discard invalid MKPDUs. In particular, it discards MKPDUs whenever:
- the destination address of the MKPDU was an individual address;
  - the MKPDU is less than 32 octets long;
  - the MKPDU is not a multiple of 4 octets long;
  - the MKPDU comprises fewer octets than indicated by the Basic Parameter Set body length, as encoded in bits 4 through 1 of octet 3 and bits 8 through 1 of octet 4, plus 16 octets of ICV; or
  - the CAK Name is not recognized.
- (**FCS\_MKA\_EXT.1**)
116. The Integrity Check Value (ICV) of MACsec protocol data units (MPDUs) is calculated using the SAK over the destination address, source address, SecTAG, and user data (after encryption, if

---

<sup>54</sup> CAK is used to generate KEK, SAK & ICK, so not used directly as encryption key.



applicable) and is encoded in the last eight to sixteen octets of theMPDU. The length of the ICV is between 8 and 16 octets, depending on the Cipher Suite. The 64 most significant bits of the 96-bit IV used in generating the ICV are the octets of the SCI and the 32 least significant bits of the 96-bit IV are the octets of the PN. (**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.2**)

117. MACsec allows IPv4/v6 and TCP/UDP headers to be unencrypted while the rest of the frame is encrypted. The offset value for MACsec protected frames are:

- Offset 0 – Default; Encrypts the entire MPDU payload in the frame
- Offset 30 – IPv4 & TCP/UDP headers are unencrypted and rest of the payload is encrypted
- Offset 50 – IPv6 & TCP/UDP headers are unencrypted and rest of the payload is encrypted

118. The MKA is used to maintain MACsec Connectivity Association (CA). The TOE enforces MKA timeouts in accordance with IEEE 802.1X-2010 and 802.1Xbx-2014 as detailed in Table 11.

Timer Use	Timeout (Parameter)	Timeout (Seconds)
Per participant periodic transmission, initialized on each transmission, transmission on expiry	MKA Hello Time MKA Bounded Hello Timeout	2.0-6.0 0.5
Per peer lifetime, initialized when adding to or refreshing the Potential Peers List or Live Peers List, expiry cause removal from the list .	MKA Life Time	6.0
Participant lifetime, initialized when participant created or following receipt of an MKPDU, expiry causes participant to be deleted.		
Delay after last distributing an SAK, before the Key Server will distribute a fresh SAK following a change in the Live Peer List while the Potential Peer List is still not empty.		

**Table 11 MKA Timeouts**

119. Each distributed SAK shall be protected by AES Key Wrap method with Key Encryption Key (KEK) as key input (**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.4**). KEK is also derived from CAK. Each participant that considers itself to be the current Key Server can distribute an SAK by encoding the following information in transmitted MKPDUs:

- The SAK protected by AES Key Wrap
- The Key Number(KN), 32 bits

120. A fresh SAK is not generated until the Key Server's Live Peer List contains at least one peer, and MKA Life Time has elapsed since the prior SAK was first distributed, or the Key Server's Potential Peer List is empty and PN number is exhausted

121. SAK is generated using KDF function AES-CMAC-128 or AES-CMAC-256 based on the cipher suite configured using the following transform function (**FCS\_MACSEC\_EXT.3**):

$$\text{SAK} = \text{KDF}(\text{Key}, \text{Label}, \text{KS-nonce} \mid \text{MI-value list} \mid \text{KN}, \text{SAKlength})$$

where

- Key= CAK
  - Label= "IEEE8021 SAK"
  - KS-nonce = a nonce of the same size as the required SAK, obtained from an RNG each time an SAK is generated.
  - MI-valuelist = a concatenation of MI values from all live participants
  - KN = four octets, the Key Number assigned by the Key Server as part of the KI .
  - SAKlength = two octets representing an integer value (128 for a 128 bit SAK, 256 for a 256 bit SAK) with the most significant octet first.
122. To protect against replay (within the Control Plane) each participant in the protocol chooses a random 96-bit member identifier (MI) when MKA begins, and this MI is used, together with a 32-bit message number (MN) initialized to 1 and incremented with each MKPDU transmitted.  
**(FPT\_RPL.1)**
123. The Data Plane replay functionality ensures that a man-in-the middle cannot replay a snooped packet or reuse packet number. As bounded receive delay functionality is not supported, it is necessary to configure replay protection in the evaluated configuration using replay-protect. The replay-window-size specifies the number of packets which can be replayed. If set to zero this means no replays are permitted (and should not be used when out of ordering is expected).  
**(FPT\_RPL.1)**

### 7.3 Administrator Authentication

124. Junos OS enforces binding between human users and subjects. The Security Administrator<sup>55</sup> is responsible for provisioning user accounts, and only the Security Administrator can do so.  
**(FMT\_SMR.2)**
125. Junos users are configured under "system login user" and are exported to the password database '/var/etc/master.passwd'. A Junos user is therefore an entry in the password database. Each entry in the password database has fields corresponding to the attributes of "system login user", including username, (obfuscated) password and login class.
126. The internal architecture supporting Authentication includes an active process, associated linked libraries and supporting configuration data. The Authentication process and library are
- *login*
  - *PAM Library module*
127. Following TOE initialization, the login process is listening for a connection at the local console. This 'login' process can be accessed through either direct connection to the local console or following successful establishment of a remote management connection over SSH, when a login prompt is displayed.
128. This login process identifies and authenticates the user using PAM operations. The login process does two things; it first establishes that the requesting user is whom they claim to be and second provides them with an interactive Junos Command interactive command line interface (CLI).
129. The SSH daemon supports public key authentication by looking up a public key in an authorized keys file located in the directory '.ssh' in the user's home directory (i.e. '~/.ssh/') and this authentication method will be attempted before any other if the client has a key available **(FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1)**. The SSH daemon will ignore the authorized keys file if it or the directory '.ssh' or the user's home directory are not owned by the user or are writeable by anyone else.

---

<sup>55</sup> The Security Administrator role is detailed in Section 7.7 below.

130. For password authentication, login interacts with a user to request a username and password to establish and verify the user's identity. The username entered by the administrator at the username prompt is reflected to the screen, but no feedback to screen is provided while the entry made by the administrator at the password prompt until the Enter key is pressed (**FIA\_UAU.7**). Login uses PAM Library calls for the actual verification of this data. The password is hashed and compared to the stored value, and success/failure is indicated to login, (**FIA\_UIA\_EXT.1**). PAM is used in the TOE support authentication management, account management, session management and password management. Login primarily uses the session management and password management functionality offered by PAM.
131. The retry-options can be configured to specify the action to be taken if the administrator fails to enter valid username/password credentials for password authentication when attempting to authenticate via remote access. The retry-options are applied following the first failed login attempt for a given username (**FIA\_AFL.1**). The length of delay (5-10 seconds) after each failed attempt is specified by the backoff-factor, and the increase of the delay for each subsequent failed attempt is specified by the backoff-threshold (1-3). The tries-before-disconnect sets the maximum number of times (1-10) the administrator is allowed to enter a password to attempt to log in to the device through SSH before the connection is disconnected. The lockout-period sets the amount of time in minutes before the administrator can attempt to log in to the device after being locked out due to the number of failed login attempts (1-43,200 minutes). It is also possible for another administrator to "unlock" the account of administrator whose account has been locked for a period of time following failed authentication attempts. Even when an account is blocked for remote access to the TOE, an administrator is always able to login locally through the serial console and the administrator can attempt authentication via remote access after the maximum timeout period of 24 hours.
132. The TOE requires users to provide unique identification and authentication data (passwords/public key) before any access to the system is granted. Prior to authentication, the only Junos OS managed responses provided to the administrator are (**FIA\_UAU\_EXT.2**):
- Negotiation of SSH session
  - Display of the access banner
  - ICMP echo responses.
133. Authentication data for fixed password authentication is a case-sensitive, alphanumeric value. The password has a minimum length of 10 characters and maximum length of 20 characters, and must contain characters from at least two different character sets (upper, lower, numeric, punctuation), and can be up to 20 ASCII characters in length (control characters are not recommended). Any standard ASCII, extended ASCII and Unicode characters can be selected when choosing a password. (**FIA\_PMG\_EXT.1**)
134. Locally stored authentication credentials are protected (**FPT\_APW\_EXT.1**):
- The passwords are stored in obfuscated form using HMAC-sha1.
  - Authentication data for public key-based authentication methods are stored in a directory owned by the user (and typically with the same name as the user). This directory contains the files '.ssh/authorized\_keys' and '.ssh/authorized\_keys2' which are used for SSH public key authentication.
135. Junos enables Security Administrators to configure an access banner provided with the authentication prompt. The banner can provide warnings against unauthorized access to the TOE as well as any other information that the Security Administrator wishes to communicate. (**FTA\_TAB.1**)

136. User sessions (local and remote) can be terminated by users (**FTA\_SSL.4**). The administrative user can logout of the existing session by typing exit to exit the CLI admin session and the Junos OS makes the current contents unreadable after the admin initiates the termination. No user activity can take place until the user re-identifies and authenticates.
137. The Security Administrator can set the TOE so that a user session is terminated after a period of inactivity. (**FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1, FTA\_SSL.3**) For each user session Junos OS maintains a count of clock cycles (provided by the system clock) since last activity. The count is reset each time there is activity related to the user session. When the counter reaches the number of clock cycles equating to the configured period of inactivity the user session is locked out.
138. Junos OS overwrites the display device and makes the current contents unreadable after the local interactive session is terminated due to inactivity, thus disabling any further interaction with the TOE. This mechanism is the inactivity timer for administrative sessions. The Security Administrator can configure this inactivity timer on administrative sessions after which the session will be logged out.

## 7.4 Correct Operation

139. Junos OS runs the following set of self-tests during power on to check the correct operation of the Junos OS firmware (**FPT\_TST\_EXT.1**):
  - Power on test – determines the boot-device responds, and performs a memory size check to confirm the amount of available memory.
  - File integrity test – verifies integrity of all mounted signed packages, to assert that system files have not been tampered with. To test the integrity of the firmware, the fingerprints of the executables and other immutable files are regenerated and validated against the SHA1 fingerprints contains in the manifest file.
  - Crypto integrity test – checks integrity of major CSPs, such as SSH hostkeys and iked credentials, such as Cas, CERTS, and various keys.
  - Authentication error – verifies that verixec is enabled and operates as expected using /opt/sbin/kats/cannot-exec.real.
  - Kernel, libmd, OpenSSL, QuickSec, SSH Ipsec – verifies correct output from known answer tests for appropriate algorithms.
140. Juniper Networks devices run only binaries supplied by Juniper Networks. Within the package, each Junos OS firmware image includes fingerprints of the executables and other immutable files. Junos firmware will not execute any binary without validating a fingerprint. This feature protects the system against unauthorized firmware and activity that might compromise the integrity of the device. These self-tests ensure that only authorized executables are allowed to run thus ensuring the correct operation of the TOE.
141. In the event of a transiently corrupt state or failure condition, the system will panic; the event will be logged and the system restarted, having ceased to process network traffic. When the system restarts, the system boot process does not succeed without passing all applicable self-tests. This automatic recovery and self-test behavior, is discussed in Chapter 11 of [ECG].
142. When any self-test fails, the device halts in an error state. No command line input or traffic to any interface is processed. The device must be power cycled to attempt to return to operation. This self-test behavior, is discussed in [ECG]. (**FPT\_FLS.1, FPT\_TST\_EXT.1, FPT\_TST\_EXT.3**)

## 7.5 Trusted Update

143. Security Administrators are able to query the current version of the TOE firmware using the CLI command “show version”(**FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1**) and, if a new version of the TOE firmware is

available, initiate an update of the TOE firmware. Junos OS does not provide partial updates for the TOE, customers requiring updates must migrate to a subsequent release. Updates are downloaded and applied manually (there is no automatic updating of the Junos OS).

**(FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1, FMT\_SMF.1/ND, FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate,)**

144. The installable firmware package includes the full Junos OS firmware. No partial updates are supported. The installable software packages have a digital signature that is checked when the Security Administrator attempts to install the package. The signature of the complete package is verified at the beginning of the installation process before the package is expanded. If signature verification fails, an error message is displayed and the package is not installed.
145. The Junos OS kernel maintains a set of fingerprints (SHA1 digests) for executable files and other files which should be immutable, as described in Section 7.4. The manifest file is signed using the Juniper package signing key and is verified by the TOE using the public key (stored on the TOE filesystem in clear, protected by filesystem access rights). ECDSA (P-256) with SHA-256 is used for digital signature package verification.
146. The fingerprint loader will only process a manifest for which it can verify the signature. Without a valid digital signature an executable cannot be run. When the command is issued to install an update, the manifest file for the update is verified and stored, and each executable/immutable file is verified before it is executed. If any of the fingerprints in an update are not correctly verified, the TOE uses the last known verified image.
147. A certificate may be loaded via command line and is stored in SSD. Access to flash memory requires administrator credentials. Control on access to the trust store holding the X509v3 certificates can be controlled using standard Junos permissions settings. Each top-level CLI command and each configuration statement have an access privilege level associated with them and users can execute only those commands and configure and view only those statements for which they have access privileges. The access privileges for each login class are defined by one or more permission flags. For each login class, the use of operational and configuration mode commands that would otherwise be permitted or not allowed by a privilege level specified in the permissions statement can be explicitly denied or allowed. Cryptographic keys are protected through the enforcement of kernel-level file access rights, limiting access to the contents of cryptographic key containers to processes with cryptographic rights. The TOE does not provide a CLI interface to permit the viewing of keys. Passwords used for authentication can be viewed by Security Administrators using the CLI command 'request system decrypt password'  
**(FIA\_X.509\_EXT.1/Rev, FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData).**
148. Junos OS verifies the validity of the signature. If the signature is not valid, the validation fails. If the signature is valid the update process proceeds. **(FCS\_COP.1/SigGen, FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1,)**

## 7.6 Audit

149. Junos OS creates and stores audit records for the following events (the detail of content recorded for each audit event is detailed in Table 4 (**FAU\_GEN.1/ND**) and Table 5 (**FAU\_GEN.1/IPS**). Auditing is implemented using syslog.
  - Start-up and shut-down of the audit functions
  - Administrative login and logout
  - Configuration is committed
  - Configuration is changed (includes all management activities of TSF data)
  - Generating/import of, changing, or deleting of cryptographic keys (see below for more detail)

- Resetting passwords
- Starting and stopping services
- All Administrator actions for configuring two instances of the TOE in Cluster Mode
- All state synchronisations between two instances of the TOE in Cluster Mode
- All use of the identification and authentication mechanisms
- Unsuccessful login attempts limit is met or exceeded
- Any attempt to initiate a manual update
- Result of the update attempt (success or failure)
- The termination of a local/remote/interactive session by the session locking mechanism
- Initiation/termination/failure of the SSH trusted channel to syslog server
- Initiation/termination/failure of the SSH trusted path with Admin
- Initiation/termination/failure of an IPsec trusted channel, including Session Establishment with peer
- Session establishment with CA
- Application of firewall rules configured with the 'log' operation by the stateful traffic filtering function
- Indication of packets dropped due to too much network traffic by the stateful traffic filtering function
- Application of rules configured with the 'log' operation by the packet filtering function
- Indication of packets dropped due to too much network traffic by the packet filtering function
- Start-up and shut-down of the IPS functions
- All dissimilar IPS events and reactions
- Totals of similar events and reactions occurring within a specified time period
- Modification of an IPS policy element
- Modification of which IPS policies are active on a TOE interface
- Enabling/disabling a TOE interface with IPS policies applied
- Modification of which mode(s) is/are active on a TOE interface
- Inspected traffic matches a list of known-good or known-bad addresses applied to an IPS policy
- Inspected traffic matches a signature-based IPS policy with logging enabled
- Inspected traffic matches an anomaly-based IPS policy

150. In addition the following management activities of TSF data are recorded:

- configure the access banner;
- configure the session inactivity time before session termination;
- configure the authentication failure parameters for FIA\_AFL.1;

- Ability to configure audit behaviour;
  - configure the cryptographic functionality;
  - configure thresholds for SSH rekeying;
  - re-enable an Administrator account;
  - set the time which is used for time-stamps.
151. The detail of what events are to be recorded by syslog are determined by the logging level specified the “level” argument of the “`set system syslog`” CLI command. To ensure compliance with the requirements the audit knobs detailed in [ECG] must be configured.
152. As a minimum, Junos OS records the following with each log entry:
- date and time of the event and/or reaction
  - type of event and/or reaction
  - subject identity (where applicable)
  - the outcome (success or failure) of the event (where applicable).
153. Because of the nature of IPS event logs, log generation often happens in bursts and can generate a large volume of messages during an attack. To manage the volume of log messages, Junos supports log suppression, which suppresses multiple instances of the same log occurring from the same or similar sessions over the same period of time. IPS log suppression is enabled by default and can be customized based on the following configurable attributes:
- Source/destination addresses;
  - Number of log occurrences after which log suppression begins;
  - Maximum number of logs that log suppression can operate on;
  - Time after which suppressed logs are reported.
154. Suppressed logs are reported as single log entries containing the count of occurrences
155. In order to identify the key being operated on, the following details are recorded for all administrative actions relating to cryptographic keys (generating, importing, changing and deleting keys):
- PKID – certificate id will be recorded when generating or deleting a key pair
  - IKE SPI – IP address of the initiator and responder recorded, together with the SPI, will be recorded when generating a key pair. The IP address of the initiator and responder will provide the unique link to the key identifier (SPI) of the key that has been destroyed in the session termination
  - SSH session keys– key reference provided by process id
  - SSH keys **created** for outbound trusted channel to external syslog server
  - SSH keys **imported** for outbound trusted channel to external syslog server
  - SSH key configured for SSH public key authentication –the hash of the public key that is to be used for authentication is recorded in syslog
156. For SSH (ephemeral) session keys the PID is used as the key reference to relate the key generation and key destruction audit events. The key destruction event is recorded as a session disconnect event. For example, key generation and key destruction events for a single SSH session key would be reflected by records similar to the following:

157. Sep 27 15:09:36 yeti sshd[6529]: Accepted publickey for root from 10.163.18.165 port 45336  
ssh2: RSA SHA256:l1vri77TPQ4VaupE2NMYiUXPnGkqBWlgD5vW0OuglGI
158. ...
159. Sep 27 15:09:40 yeti sshd[6529]: Received disconnect from 10.163.18.165 port 45336:11:  
disconnected by user
160. Sep 27 15:09:40 yeti sshd[6529]: Disconnected from 10.163.18.165 port 45336
161. SSH keys **generated** for outbound trusted channels are uniquely identified in the audit record by the public key filename and fingerprint. For example:
162. Sep 27 23:36:49 yeti ssh-keygen [67873]: Generated SSH key file /root/.ssh/id\_rsa.pub with  
fingerprint SHA256:g+7lsR7x4lQb1JT8Q3scfb2sOl8lyccoJGdmkmw4dWM
163. SSH keys **imported** for use in establishing outbound trusted channels are uniquely identified in the audit record by the hash of the key imported and the username importing (to which the key will be bound).
164. It should be noted that SSH keys used for trusted channels are NOT deleted by mgd when SSH is de-configured. Hence, the only time SSH keys used for trusted channels are deleted is when a “request system zeroize” action is performed and the whole appliance is zeroized (which by definition cannot be recorded)
165. All events recorded by syslog are timestamped. The clock function of Junos OS provides a source of date and time information for the appliance, used in audit timestamps, which is maintained using the hardware Time Stamp Counter as the clock source. (**FAU\_GEN.2, FPT\_STM\_EXT.1**)
166. Syslog can be configured to store the audit logs locally (**FAU\_STG\_EXT.1**), and optionally to send them to one or more syslog log servers via Netconf over SSH (**FAU\_STG.1, FMT\_MOF.1/Functions**). Local audit log are stored in /var/log/ in the underlying filesystem. Only a Security Administrator can read log files, or delete log and archive files through the CLI interface or through direct access to the filesystem having first authenticated as a Security Administrator. The syslogs are automatically deleted locally according to configurable limits on storage volume. The default maximum size is 1Gb. The default maximum size can be modified by the user, using the “size” argument for the “set system syslog” CLI command.
167. The Junos OS defines an active log file and a number of “archive” files (10 by default, but configurable from 1 to 1000). When the active log file reaches its maximum size, the logging utility closes the file, compresses it, and names the compressed archive file ‘logfile.0.gz’. The logging utility then opens and writes to a new active log file. When the new active log file reaches the configured maximum size, ‘logfile.0.gz’ is renamed ‘logfile.1.gz’, and the active log file is closed, compressed, and renamed ‘logfile.0.gz’. When the maximum number of archive files is reached and when the size of the active file reaches the configured maximum size, the contents of the oldest archived file are deleted so the current active file can be archived.
168. A 1Gb syslog file takes approximately 0.25Gb of storage when archived. Syslog files can acquire complete storage allocated to /var filesystem, which is platform specific. However, when the filesystem reaches 92% storage capacity an event is raised to the administrator but the eventd process (being a privileged process) still can continue using the reserved storage blocks. This allows the syslog to continue storing events while the administrator frees the storage. If the administrator does not free the storage in time and the /var filesystem storage becomes exhausted a final entry is recorded in the log reporting “No space left on device” and logging is terminated. The appliance continues to operate in the event of exhaustion of audit log storage space.



## 7.7 Management

169. Accounts assigned to the Security Administrator role are used to manage Junos OS in accordance with [CPP\_ND]. User accounts in the TOE have the following attributes: user identity (user name), authentication data (password) and role (privilege). The Security Administrator is associated with the defined login class “security-admin”, which has the necessary permission set to permit the administrator to perform all tasks necessary to manage Junos OS in accordance with the requirements of [CPP\_ND]. **(FMT\_SMR.2)**
170. The TOE provides user access either through the system console or remotely over the Trusted Path using the SSHv2 protocol. Users are required to provide unique identification and authentication data before any access to the system is granted, as detailed in Section 7.2 above. **(FMT\_SMR.2, FMT\_SMF.1/ND)**
171. The Security Administrator has the capability to:
- Administer the TOE locally via the serial ports on the physical device or remotely over an SSH connection.
  - Initiate a manual update of TOE firmware **(FMT\_MOF.1/ManualUpdate)**:
    - Query currently executing version of TOE firmware **(FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1)**
    - Verify update using digital signature **(FPT\_TUD\_EXT.1)**
  - Manage Functions:
    - Transmission of audit data to an external IT entity, including Start/stop and modify the behaviour of the trusted communication channel to external syslog server (netconf over SSH) and the trusted path for remote Administrative sessions (SSH) **(FMT\_MOF.1/Functions, FMT\_MOF.1/Services, FMT\_SMF.1/ND, FMT\_SMF.1/IPS)**
    - Configuring the packet filtering rules of the TOE **(FMT\_SMF.1/FFW, FMT\_SMF.1/VPN)**
    - Handling of audit data, including setting limits of log file size **(FMT\_MOF.1/Functions)**
  - Manage TSF data **(FMT\_MTD.1/CoreData)**
    - Create, modify, delete administrator accounts, including configuration of authentication failure parameters
    - Reset administrator passwords
    - Re-enable an Administrator account **(FIA\_AFL.1)**;
  - Manage crypto keys **(FMT\_MTD.1/CryptoKeys)**:
    - SSH key generation (ecdsa, ssh-rsa)
    - IKE authentication key generation (ecdsa, rsa)
    - IKE public-key certificate management
  - Perform management functions (FMT\_SMF.1/IPS, FMT\_SMF.1/ND, FMT\_SMF.1/FFW, FMT\_SMF.1/VPN):
    - Configure the access banner **(FTA\_TAB.1)**
    - Configure the session inactivity time before session termination or locking, including termination of session when serial console cable is disconnected **(FTA\_SSL\_EXT.1, FTA\_SSL.3)**

- Ability to import X.509v3 certificates (**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1**)
- Manage cryptographic functionality (**FCS\_SSHS\_EXT.1**), including:
  - ssh ciphers
  - hostkey algorithm
  - key exchange algorithm
  - hashed message authentication code
  - thresholds for SSH rekeying
- Set the system time and configure NTP (**FPT\_STM\_EXT.1**);
- Ability to configure Firewall rules (**FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1**);
- Ability to configure the VPN-associated cryptographic functionality (**FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS\_CKM.1.1/IKE, FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1**);
- Ability to configure the IPsec functionality (**FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1**), including configuration of IKE lifetime-seconds (within range 180 to 86400<sup>56</sup>, with default value of 180 seconds), IPsec lifetime-seconds (within range 180 to 86400, with default value of 28800 seconds<sup>57</sup>), and Lifetime-kilobytes (within range 64 to 4294967294 kilobytes) and ability to configure the reference identifier for the peer;
- Ability to enable, disable, determine and modify behavior, and configure all other VPN-associated security functions of the TOE identified in [MOD\_VPNGW] (**FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1, FCS\_COP.1/DataEncryption, FCS\_CKM.1.1/IKE, FCS\_IPSEC\_EXT.1**);
- Enable, disable signatures applied to sensor interfaces, and determine the behavior of IPS functionality (**IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1, IPS\_IPB\_EXT.1, IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1, IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1**)
- Modify these parameters that define the network traffic to be collected and analysed (**IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1**):
  - Source IP addresses (host address and network address);
  - Destination IP addresses (host address and network address);
  - Source port (TCP and UDP);
  - Destination port (TCP and UDP);
  - Protocol (IPv4 and IPv6)
  - ICMP type and code
- Update (import) IPS signatures (**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1**);
- Create custom IPS signatures (**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1**);
- Configure anomaly detection (**IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1**);
- Enable and disable actions to be taken when signature or anomaly matches are detected (**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1**);
- Modify thresholds that trigger IPS reactions (**IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1**);
- Modify the duration of traffic blocking actions (**IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1**);
- Modify the known-good and known-bad lists (of IP addresses or address ranges) (**IPS\_IPB\_EXT.1**);
- Configure the known-good and known-bad lists to override signature-based IPS policies (**IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1**);
- Manage the packet filtering rules and VPN configuration (**FMT\_SMF.1/VPN**)
- Perform MACsec management functions (**FMT\_SMF.1**):
  - Ability to generate a PSK and install it in the device
  - CLI commands to manage the Key Server to create, delete, and activate MKA participants

---

<sup>56</sup> 180 to 86400 seconds is a range of 3 minutes to 24 hours.

<sup>57</sup> 28800 seconds is 8 hours.

- Enable, disable, or delete a PSK-based CAK using CLI commands

172. Detailed topics on the secure management of Junos OS are discussed in [ECG].

## 7.8 User Data Protection

173. The only resource made available to information flowing through a TOE is the temporary storage of packet information when access is requested and when information is being routed. User data is not persistent when resources are released by one user/process and allocated to another user/process. Temporary storage (memory) used to build network packets is erased when the resource is called into use by the next user/process. Junos knows, and keeps track of, the length of the packet. This means that when memory allocated from a previous user/process arrives to build the next network packet, Junos is aware of when the end of the packet is reached and pads a short packet with zeros accordingly. Therefore, no residual information from packets in a previous information stream can traverse through the TOE. (**FDP\_RIP.2**)

## 7.9 Packet Filtering/Stateful Traffic

174. The boot sequence of the TOE appliances also aids in establishing the securing domain and preventing tampering or bypass of security functionality. This includes ensuring the packet filtering rules cannot be bypassed during the boot sequence of the TOE. The following steps list the boot sequence for the TOE:

- BIOS hardware and memory checks
- Loading and initialization of the FreeBSD Kernel OS
- FIPS self-tests and firmware integrity tests are executed
- The init utility is started (mounts file systems, sets up network cards to communicate on the network, and generally starts all the processes that usually are run on a FreeBSD system at startup)
- Daemon programs such as Internet Service Daemon (INETD), Routing Protocol Daemon (RPD), Syslogd are started; Routing and forwarding tables are initialized
- Management Daemon (or MGD) is loaded, allowing access to management interface
- Physical interfaces are active

175. Once the interfaces are brought up, they will start to receive and send packets based on the current configuration (or not receive or send any packets if they have not been previously configured). Interfaces are brought up only after successful loading of kernel and Information Flow subsystems, and these interfaces cannot send or receive packets unless previously configured by an Administrator. Since the Management Daemon is not loaded until after the kernel and INETD are initialized, no modification to the security attributes can be made by a user or process other than via the management process.

176. The trusted and untrusted network connection interfaces on the security appliance are not enabled until all of the components on the appliance are fully initialized; power-up tests are successful and ready to enforce the configured security policies. In this manner, the TOE ensures that Administrators are appropriately authorized when they exercise management commands and any network traffic is always subject to the configured information flow policies.

177. The TOE is configured to associate network interfaces to IP subnets. Source IP addresses are then associated with the network interface.

178. Junos is composed of a number of separate executables, or daemons. If a failure occurs in the "flow" daemon (flowd) causing it to halt, no packet processing will occur and no packets will be

forwarded. A failure in another daemon will not prevent the flow daemon from enforcing the policy rule set.

179. The Information Flow subsystem is responsible for processing the arriving packets from the network to the TOE's network interface. Based on Administrator-configured policy, interface and zone information, the packet flows through the various modules of the Information Flow subsystem. Rules within policies are processed in an Administrator-defined order when network traffic flows through the TOE network interfaces. By default, the TOE behavior is to deny packets when there is no rule match unless another required condition allows the network traffic. If a security risk is found in the packet. e.g. denial-of-service attacks, the packet is dropped and an event is logged. The packet does not continue to the next module for processing. If the packet is not dropped by a given module, the interrupt handling routine calls the function for the next relevant module. In case of an interface getting overwhelmed, packets are dropped. This is recorded by the SNMP mibs as well as a log. When an interface gets overwhelmed with CPU utilization 99% then packets are dropped with syslog record as 'CPU Utilization greater than 99, expect packet loss'.
180. The Information Flow subsystem consists of the following modules:
  - IP Classification Module
  - Attack Detection Module
  - Session Lookup Module
  - Security Policy Module
  - Session Setup Module
  - Inetd Module
  - Rdp Module
181. The IP Classification module retrieves information from packets received on the network interface device, classifies packets into several categories, saves classification information in packet processing context, and provides other modules with that information for assisting further processing.
182. The Attack Detection module provides inline attack detection such as IP Spoofing for the security appliance. This module monitors arriving traffic, performs predefined attack detection services (prevents attacks), and issues actions when an attack is found.
183. The Session Lookup module performs lookups in the session table which is used for all interfaces based on the information in incoming packets. Specifically, the lookup is based on the exact match of source IP address and port, destination IP address and port, protocol attributes (e.g., SYN, ACK, RST, and FIN), and egress/ingress zone. The input is passed to the module as a set of parameters from the Attack Detection module via a function call. The module returns matching wing if a match is found and 0 otherwise. Sessions are removed when terminated.
184. The Session Setup module is only available for packets that do not match current established sessions. It is activated after the Session Lookup module. If packet has a matched session, it will skip the session setup module and proceed to the Security Policy module, and other modules. Eventually if the packet is not destined for the TOE, the Network interface will pass the traffic out of the appliance.
185. The Security Policy module examines traffic passing through the TOE (via Session Setup module) and determines if the traffic can pass based on administrator-configured access policies. The Security Policy module is the core of the firewall and IPS functionalities in the TOE: It is the policy

enforcement engine that fulfills the security requirements for the user. The Security Policy module will deny packets when there is no policy match unless another policy allows the traffic.

186. The Session Setup module performs the auditing of denied packets. If there is a policy to specifically deny traffic, traffic matching this deny policy is dropped and logged in traffic log. If there is no policy to deny traffic, traffic that does not match any policy is dropped and not logged. In either case, Session Setup module does not create any sessions for denied traffic. Sessions are created for allowed traffic.
187. The INETD module provides internet services for the TOE. The module listens on designated ports used by internet services such as FTP. When a TCP or UDP packet arrives with a particular destination port number, INETD launches the appropriate server program (e.g., SSHD) to handle the connection.
188. The RPD (Routing Protocol Daemon) module provides the implementations and algorithms for the routing protocols and route calculations. The primary goal of the RPD is to create and maintain the Routing Information Base (RIB), which is a database of routing entries. Each routing entry consists of a destination address and some form of next hop information. RPD module maintains the internal routing table and properly distributes routes from the routing table to Kernel subsystem used for traffic forwarding at the Network interface.
189. The TOE performs stateful network traffic filtering on network packets using the following network traffic protocols and network fields conforming to the described RFCs:

PROTOCOL/RFC	FIELDS
Internet Control Message Protocol version 4 (ICMPv4) RFC 792 (ICMPv4)	Type Code
Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) RFC 4443 (ICMPv6)	Type Code
Internet Protocol (IPv4) RFC 791 (IPv4)	Source address Destination Address Transport Layer Protocol
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) RFC 2460 (IPv6)	Source address Destination Address Transport Layer Protocol
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) RFC 793 (TCP)	Source port Destination port
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) RFC 768 (UDP)	Source port Destination port

**Table 12 Traffic Filtering RFCs**

190. Conformance to these RFCs is demonstrated by protocol compliance testing by the product QA team.
191. The TOE shall allow permit, deny, and log operations to be associated with rules and these rules can be assigned to distinct network interfaces.
192. The TOE accepts network packets if it matches an established TCP, UDP or ICMP session using:
  - TCP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, sequence number, flags
  - UDP: source and destination addresses, source and destination ports
  - ICMP: source and destination addresses, type, code

193. The TOE will remove existing traffic flows due to session inactivity timeout, or completion of the session.
194. The TOE supports FTP (RFC 959) to dynamically establish sessions allowing network traffic according to Administrator rules. Session events will be logged in accordance with 'log' operations defined in the rules. Source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, transport layer protocol, and TOE Interface are recorded in each log record. **(FFW\_RUL\_EXT.2)**
195. Junos implements what is referred to as an Application Layer gateway (ALG) that inspects FTP traffic to determine the port number used for data sessions. The ALG permits data traffic for the duration of the session, closing the port when the session ends. In this context, "session" refers to the TCP data transfer connection, not the duration of the FTP control session. Junos implements ALGs for a number of protocols.
196. The TOE enforces the following default reject rules with logging on all network traffic:
- invalid fragments;
  - fragmented IP packets which cannot be re-assembled completely;
  - where the source address is equal to the address of the network interface where the network packet was received;
  - where the source address does not belong to the networks associated with the network interface where the network packet was received;
  - where the source address is defined as being on a broadcast network;
  - where the source address is defined as being on a multicast network;
  - where the source address is defined as being a loopback address;
  - where the source address is a multicast;
  - packets where the source or destination address is a link-local address;
  - where the source or destination address is defined as being an address "reserved for future use" as specified in RFC 5735 for IPv4;
  - where the source or destination address is defined as an "unspecified address" or an address "reserved for future definition and use" as specified in RFC 3513 for IPv6;
  - with the IP options: Loose Source Routing, Strict Source Routing, or Record Route specified;
  - packets are checked for validity. "Invalid fragments" are those that violate these rules:
    - No overlap
    - The total fragments in one packet should not be more than 62 pieces
    - The total length of merged fragments should not larger than 64k
    - All fragments in one packet should arrive in 2 seconds
    - The total queued fragments has limitation, depending on the platform
    - The total number of concurrent fragment processing for different packet has limitations depending on platform
197. The TOE can be configured to drop connection attempts after a defined number of half-open TCP connections using the Junos screen 'tcp syn-flood', which provides both source and destination thresholds on the number of uncompleted TCP connections, as well as a timeout period. The source threshold option allows administrators to specify the number of SYN

segments received per second from a single source IP address—regardless of the destination IP address—before Junos OS begins dropping connection requests from that source. Similarly, the destination threshold option allows administrators to specify the number of SYN segments received per second for a single destination IP address before Junos OS begins dropping connection requests to that destination. The timeout option allows administrators to set the maximum length of time before an uncompleted connection is dropped from the queue.

198. For more information about configuring event logging, see Junos OS Complete Software Guide for SRX Series Services Gateways (Volume 2), Guide 4: 'Building Blocks Feature Guide for Security Devices' and [ECG] (*FFW\_RUL\_EXT.1, FPF\_RUL\_EXT.1*)

## 7.10 Intrusion Prevention System

199. The Junos OS Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) policy enables selectively enforcing various attack detection and prevention techniques on network traffic passing through an IDP-enabled device. Policy rules can be defined to match a section of traffic based on a zone, network, and application, and then take active or passive preventive actions on that traffic.
200. An IDP policy is made up of rule bases, and each rule base contains a set of rules that specify rule parameters, such as traffic match conditions, action, and logging requirements. IDP policies can then be associated to firewall policies. IDP can be invoked on a firewall rule by rule basis for maximum granularity. Only firewall policies marked for IDP will be processed by IDP engine, all other rules will only be processed by the firewall<sup>58</sup>.
201. Firewall Policies match Source Zone, Destination Zone, Source IP, Destination IP, Source Port, Destination Port, and Protocol. Interface and VLAN matching can be achieved through the use of zones. Rules are organized into a firewall policy rulebase. Within IPS Policies, further matching for specific attacks is done on Source Zone, Destination Zone, Source IP, Destination IP, Source Port, Destination Port, and Protocol. Interface matching can be achieved through the use of zones. Attack Actions are configurable on a rule by rule basis. Rules within policies are processed in an Administrator-defined order when network traffic flows through the TOE network interfaces. (*IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1.1*)
202. Once stateful firewall processing of packets has been performed by the Information Flow subsystem, if a firewall policy that has been marked for IDP processing is triggered, the packets are processed by the IPS subsystem as follows:
- Fragmentation Processing – IP Fragments are reordered and reassembled. Duplicate, over/undersized, overlapping, incomplete and other invalid fragments are discarded.
  - Flow Module SSL Decryption – sessions are checked for existing IP Actions, if none exist, new sessions are created. If a destination is marked for SSL decryption, a copy of the SSL traffic will be sent to the decryption engine. The original packet will be queue until inspection is complete.
  - Packet Serialization and TCP Reassembly – packets are ordered and all TCP packets are reassembled into complete application messages.
  - Application ID – pattern matching is performed on the traffic to determine what application the traffic is. The traffic is still inspected for Attacks, even if application cannot be determined.
  - Protocol Decoding – protocol parsing and decoding is performed. Messages are deconstructed into application “contexts” which identify components of messages.

---

<sup>58</sup> Note that some of the security functionality required by [MOD\_IPS] is implemented at the firewall level without intervention of Junos IDP engine.

Protocol Anomaly Detection is performed, along with AppDoS (if configured) by thresholds of these contexts.

- Attack Signature Matching – signatures are detected via deterministic finite automaton (DFA) pattern matching.
  - IDP Attack Actions – when an attack is detected the corresponding policy configured action is executed. Possible actions include:
    - No Action
    - Drop packet
    - Drop connection
    - Close client (send an RST packet to the client)
    - Close server (sends an RST packet to the server)
    - Close client and server (sends an RST packet to both client and server)
203. The TOE supports stateful signature based attack detection defined as Attack Objects. Attack Objects use context based matching to match regular expressions in specific locations where they occur. Attack Objects can be composed of multiple signatures and protocol anomalies, including logical expressions between signatures for compound matching.
204. As indicated in Section 7.9 the TOE is capable of inspecting IPv4, IPv6, ICMPv4, TCP and UPD traffic. Conformance to these RFCs is demonstrated by protocol compliance testing by the product QA team. (*IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1.2*)
205. The TOE is capable of inspecting all traffic passing through the TOE's Ethernet interfaces (inline mode). Ethernet interfaces can be assigned to Zones on which firewall and IDP policies are predicated. The TOE supports management through the console port, as well as through a dedicated Ethernet management port whose traffic is never processed for routing. Remote management of the TOE can also be performed via SSH as described in Section 7.1.3. (*IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1.3*)
206. The TOE supports the definition of known-good and known-bad lists of source and/or destination addresses at the firewall rule level as described in Section 7.9. Address ranges can be defined by creating address book entries and attaching them to firewall policies. (*IPS\_IPB\_EXT.1*)
207. IPS signatures (in the sense of the IPS EP) are articulated at different points along the traffic processing flow implemented in the TOE. In Junos OS, interfaces are grouped into zones. The TOE supports the definition of signatures at the zone level, also known as the screen level. Junos OS screen options secure a zone by inspecting, then allowing or denying, all connection attempts that require crossing an interface bound to that zone. Sanity checks on IPv4 and IPv6 aimed at detecting malformed packets are performed at the screen level. In addition to attack detection and prevention at the screen level, Junos OS implements firewall and IDP policies at the inter-, intra-, and super-zone policy levels (super-zone here means in global policies, where no security zones are referenced). The TOE supports inspection of the following packet header information:
- IPv4: Version; Header Length; Packet Length; ID; IP Flags; Fragment Offset; Time to Live (TTL); Protocol; Header Checksum; Source Address; Destination Address; and IP Options.
  - IPv6: Version; traffic class; flow label; payload length; next header; hop limit; source address; destination address; routing header; home address options.
  - ICMP: Type; Code; Header Checksum; and Rest of Header (varies based on the ICMP type and code).
  - ICMPv6: Type; Code; and Header Checksum.



- TCP: Source port; destination port; sequence number; acknowledgement number; offset; reserved; TCP flags; window; checksum; urgent pointer; and TCP options.
  - UDP: Source port; destination port; length; and UDP checksum.
208. Signatures can be defined to match the any of above header-field values, using the command “set security idp custom-attack”, along with the actions (allow/block), using the command “set security idp idp-policy”, that the TOE will perform when a match is found in the processed packets. The matching criteria can be "equal", "greater-than", "less-than" or "not-equal".  
**(IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.1)**
209. The TOE also supports string-based pattern-matching inspection of packet payload data for the above listed protocols. For TCP payload inspection, Junos OS provides pre-defined attack signatures to detect FTP commands, HTTP commands and content, and STMP states. Alternative, administrators can define custom-attack signatures for these application layer protocols using the command “set security idp custom-attack”. **(IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.2)**
210. The TOE is capable of detecting the following signatures using Junos predefined screen options:

MOD IPS signature name	Junos screen name
IP Fragments Overlap (Teardrop attack, Bonk attack, or Boink attack)	ip tear-drop
IP source address equal to the IP destination (Land attack)	tcp land
Fragmented ICMP Traffic (e.g. Nuke attack)	icmp fragment
Large ICMP Traffic (Ping of Death attack)	icmp ping-death
TCP NULL flags	tcp tcp-no-flag
TCP SYN+FIN flags	tcp syn-fin
TCP FIN only flags	tcp fin-no-ack
UDP Bomb Attack	n/a (configured by default)
ICMP flooding (Smurf attack, and ping flood)	icmp flood
TCP flooding (e.g. SYN flood)	tcp syn-flood
IP protocol scanning	ip unknown-protocol
TCP port scanning	tcp port-scan
UDP port scanning	udp port-scan
ICMP scanning	icmp ip-sweep

**Table 13 IPS signature names**

211. The default action for the above screens is to drop the packets. To allow the packets through, the “alarm-without-drop” action can be defined using the command “set security screen ids-option”.
212. The TOE is also capable of detecting the following signatures:
- TCP SYN+RST flags, by defining an custom attack to match “protocol tcp tcp-flags rst” and “protocol tcp tcp-flags syn”<sup>59</sup>;
  - UDP Chargen DoS attack , by configuring a firewall policy to match the predefined “junos-chargen” with the desired allow/block reaction;
  - Flooding of a network (DoS attack), by the configuration of policers that allow establishing prioritization and bandwidth limits for different type of network traffic.  
**(IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.3, IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1.4)**

<sup>59</sup> By default the TOE will drop packets where the TCP flags SYN and ACK are set at the screen level.

213. The TOE allows administrators to define signatures for anomalous traffic in terms of throughput (bits per second), time of the day for defined source/destination address and source/destination port, frequency of traffic patterns and thresholds of traffic patterns.
214. Anomaly signatures based on time of day characteristics are implemented by configuring schedulers using the Junos command 'set schedulers' and attaching them to firewall policies, which in turn specify the target traffic in terms of IP addresses and port numbers as well as the action to be performed on signature triggering (allow or block/drop traffic).
215. Anomaly signatures based on throughput characteristics are implemented by configuring policers with a bandwidth limit and the desired signature action (discard or forward), using the Junos command 'set firewall policer', and attaching it to any interface with the Junos command 'set interfaces'. Traffic exceeding the specified throughput limit is dropped when the policer is configured to discard traffic. A policer can be applied to specific inbound or outbound IP packets in a Layer 3 traffic flow at a logical interface by using a stateless firewall filter. If an input firewall filter is configured on the same logical interface as a policer, the policer is executed first. If an output firewall filter is configured on the same logical interface as a policer, the firewall filter is executed first. (*IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1*)
216. For more information about configuring event logging, see the Junos OS Complete Software Guide for SRX Series Services Gateways (Volume 2), Part 9: 'Intrusion Detection and Prevention Feature Guide for Security Devices' and the Junos OS Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for SRX Series Security Devices. (*IPS\_NTA\_EXT.1, IPS\_IPB\_EXT.1, IPS\_SBD\_EXT.1, IPS\_ABD\_EXT.1*)

## 8 Rationales

### 8.1 SFR dependency analysis

217. The dependencies between SFRs implemented by the TOE are satisfied as demonstrated in [CPP\_ND] Appendix E.1.

Security Functional Requirement	Dependency	Rationale
FAU_GEN.1/ND	FPT_STM.1	FPT_STM_EXT.1 included (which is hierarchic to FPT_STM.1)
FAU_GEN.1/IPS	FPT_STM.1	FPT_STM_EXT.1 included (which is hierarchic to FPT_STM.1)
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1 FIA_UID.1	FAU_GEN.1 Included Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator identification timing
FAU_STG_EXT.1	FAU_GEN.1 FTP_ITC.1	FAU_GEN.1 included FTP_ITC.1 included
FAU_STG.1	FAU_GEN.1	FAU_GEN.1 Included
FCS_CKM.1/ND	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.1/IKE	FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.2	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import) FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_CKM.4	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1	FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import)
FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import) FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import) FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/Hash	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import) FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_ITC.2 or FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.4	FCS_CKM.1 included (also FTP_ITC.1 as a secure channel that could be used for import) FCS_CKM.4 included
FCS_RBG_EXT.1	None	n/a

Security Functional Requirement	Dependency	Rationale
FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_RBG_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1 included FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption included FCS_COP.1/SigGen included FCS_COP.1/Hash included FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included
FCS_NTP_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1/Hash	FCS_COP.1/Hash included
FCS_SSHS_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_CKM.2 FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption FCS_COP.1/SigGen FCS_COP.1/Hash FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_RBG_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1 included FCS_CKM.2 included FCS_COP.1/DataEncryption included FCS_COP.1/SigGen included FCS_COP.1/Hash included FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash included FCS_RBG_EXT.1 included
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1	Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator authentication
FIA_PMG_EXT.1	None	n/a
FIA_UIA_EXT.1	FTA_TAB.1	FTA_TAB.1 included
FIA_UAU_EXT.2	None	n/a
FIA_UAU.7	FIA_UAU.1	Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator authentication
FIA_X509_EXT.1/Rev	None	n/a
FIA_X509_EXT.2	None	n/a
FIA_X509_EXT.3	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation	FCS_CKM.1/ND included
FIA_PSK_EXT.1	None	n/a
FMT_MOF.1/ManualUpdate	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2 included FMT_SMF.1/ND included
FMT_MOF.1/Services	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2 included FMT_SMF.1/ND, FMT_SMF.1/IPS, FMT_SMF.1/FFW included
FMT_MOF.1/Functions	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2 included FMT_SMF.1/ND included
FMT_MTD.1/CoreData	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2 included FMT_SMF.1/ND included
FMT_MTD.1/CryptoKeys	FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMR.2 included FMT_SMF.1/ND included
FMT_SMF.1/ND	None	n/a
FMT_SMF.1/IPS	None	n/a
FMT_SMF.1/VPN	None	n/a
FMT_SMF.1/FFW	None	n/a
FMT_SMR.2	FIA_UID.1	Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator authentication
FPT_SKP_EXT.1	None	n/a
FPT_APW_EXT.1	None	n/a

Security Functional Requirement	Dependency	Rationale
FPT_TST_EXT.1	None	n/a
FPT_TST_EXT.3	None	n/a
FPT_TUD_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1/SigGen or FCS_COP.1/Hash	FCS_COP.1/SigGen
FPT_STM.EXT.1	None	n/a
FPT_FLS.1/SelfTest	None	n/a
FTA_SSL_EXT.1	FIA_UID.1	Satisfied by FIA_UIA_EXT.1, which specifies the relevant Administrator authentication
FTA_SSL.3	None	n/a
FTA_SSL.4	None	n/a
FTA_TAB.1	None	n/a
FTP_ITC.1	None	n/a
FTP_TRP.1/Admin	None	n/a
FDP_RIP.2	None	n/a
FPF_RUL_EXT.1	None	n/a
FFW_RUL_EXT.1	None	n/a
FFW_RUL_EXT.2	FFW_RUL_EXT.1	FFW_RUL_EXT.1 included
IPS_NTA_EXT.1	None	n/a
IPS_IPB_EXT.1	None	n/a
IPS_SBD_EXT.1	None	n/a
IPS_ABD_EXT.1	None	n/a

Table 14 SFR Dependency Analysis

## 9 Glossary

AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Program Interface
BGP	Border Gateway Protocol
cPP	collaborative Protection Profile
CCM	Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code
CFP	C Form-factor Pluggable
CM	Configuration Management
CSP	Critical security parameter
DFA	Deterministic Finite Automaton
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DH	Diffie Hellman
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC	Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
ESP	Encapsulating Security Payload
FFC	Finite Field Cryptography
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standard
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
PIM	Gigabit-Backplane PIM
HA	High Availability
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Authentication Code
I&A	Identification and Authentication
ICMP	Internet Control Message Protocol
ID	Identification
IDS	Intrusion Detection System
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IKE	Internet Key Exchange
IOC	I/O (Input/Output) Cards
IP	Internet Protocol
IPS	Intrusion Prevention System
IPsec	Internet Protocol Security
IPsec ESP	Internet Protocol Security Encapsulating Security Payload
IPv6	Internet Protocol Version 6
IPX	Internetwork Packet Exchange
ISAKMP	Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
IS-IS	Intermediate System-to-Intermediate System
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IT	Information Technology
JET	Junos Extension toolkit. Control plane APIs for Junos.
KAS	Key Agreement Scheme
Junos	Juniper Operating System
LDP	Label Distribution Protocol
MAC	Mandatory Access Control
MIC	Modular Interface Cards
MPC	Modular Port Concentrator
MRE	Medium Robustness Environment
NAT	Network Address Translation
NDcPP	Network Device collaborative Protection Profile

NTP	Network Time Protocol
OSI	Open Systems Interconnect
OSP	Organizational Security Policy
OSPF	Open Shortest Path First
PAM	Pluggable Authentication Module
PFE	Packet Forwarding Engine
PFEF	Linux process that manages the PFE. Also referred to as forwarding daemon.
PIC/PIM	Physical Interface Card/Module
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
POE	Power over Ethernet
PP	Protection Profile
PRNG	Pseudo Random Number Generator
QSFP	Quad SFP
RE	Routing Engine
RFC	Request for Comment
RIP	Routing Information Protocol
RNG	Random Number Generator
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adelman
SA	Security Association
SCB	Switch Control Board
SCEP	Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol
SFP	Small Form-factor Pluggable
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
SPC	Services Processing Card
SPU	Services Processing Units
SSC	Shared Secret Computation
SSD	Solid State Drive
SSH	Secure Shell
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
ST	Security Target
TCP/IP	Transmissions Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSFI	TSF interfaces
UDP	User Datagram Protocol
VPN	Virtual Private Network
VDSL	Very-high-bit-rate Digital Subscriber Line
XFP	10 Gigabit SFP